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ABSTRACT

The international political landscape of the 21st century is strewn with terrorist groups
that choose to act violently in order for their political messages to be heard. Around the world
groups have been formed to defend their ideologies and fulfill their political agendas through
acts of terrorism. The Baader-Meinhof Gang [also known as the Red Army Faction], the
Weather Underground, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, HAMAS, and the Irish Republican Army have existed for many
decades. They represent only a small handful of terrorist groups that have kidnapped, targeted
public institutions with bombs, and employed suicide terrorism. More often than not innocent
civilians become involved in the carnage of an act of terrorism when they are caught off guard as
unassuming bystanders.
On September 11th, 2001 both the American public and US government officials bore the
weight of that horrific day. Since 9-11, Americans were robbed of their sense of safety, and the
American dream of tranquility was shattered. A general unease spread from the wreckage of the
World Trade Centers, and with the passing of time a keen sense of awareness about terrorism
took its place. The events of 9/11 have made US citizens fully cognizant that there are many
actors actively plotting the destruction of the US. Now, eight years later, Americans live with
the daily realization that such a heinous act could happen again, in some other unimaginable
form. For the US government, the past eight years have been marked with as many successes as
failures. The consequences of the inability of the US intelligence community to foresee the
international plot unfolding, within and outside of the homeland, resulted in a major
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reorganization within the US government. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was
established on November 25, 2002, and was created solely to address US vulnerabilities
highlighted by the actions of nineteen al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. The DHS’ main responsibility
is to improve communication and information sharing among various intelligence-gathering
agencies, so another attempt to plan an attack like 9/11 on US soil would be foiled before it
materialized.
The US government would no longer be noncommittal in the face of terrorism, as it had
before 9/11. Clear messages to terrorists were sent on October 7th, 2001, through the US invasion
of Afghanistan, and subsequently on March 20th, 2003 through the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the
US’ stance on the War on Terrorism was effectively and clearly communicated to al-Qaeda and
throughout the rest of the world. The US might once have been labeled a paper tiger, but hitting
the US at the core of their financial and military symbols struck a nerve. The terrorist attacks of
2001 taught the US government a vital lesson, but the military campaigns of Afghanistan and
Iraq would demonstrate that the US had even more to learn about the newest military tactics and
techniques employed by the enemy, and how these tactics impacted on US military operations,
strategies, and policies.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
A Startling Awakening

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the impact that suicide terrorism had on
US National Security Strategy and US military strategy, due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
My conclusion is that suicide terrorism did impact US National Security Strategy and US
military strategy, which resulted in the US government changing their policies and military
strategies. The material used to support my conclusion will be drawn from an analysis of key
strategic goals within the 2002 and 2006 US National Security (NSS), the goals in the 2001 and
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the statistics from the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) 2008 Report on Terrorism. The statistics focus on the trends of Person- Borne
Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED) and Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive
Devices (VBIED)-related attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Acts of terrorism certainly aren’t a new global phenomenon. Terrorism dates back to the
Jewish Zealot movement of the Sicarii in A.D 66-70, as well as the Isma’ili Fedyaeen cult of
“assassins,” who opposed the ruler of the Fertile Crescent in A.D. 1090-1256. The French
Revolution of 1793 is probably one of the most prominent historical events when we think of
“Terror” and “Terrorism.” The international political landscape of the 21st century is strewn with
terrorist groups that choose to act violently in order for their political messages to be heard.
Around the world groups have been formed to defend their ideologies and fulfill their political
agendas through acts of terrorism. The Baader-Meinhof Gang [also known as the Red Army
Faction], the Weather Underground, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah, the
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Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, HAMAS, and the Irish Republican Army have
existed for many decades. They represent only a small handful of terrorist groups that have
kidnapped, targeted public institutions with bombs, and employed suicide terrorism. More often
than not innocent civilians become involved in the carnage of an act of terrorism when they are
caught off guard as unassuming bystanders.
On September 11th, 2001 both the American public and US government officials bore the
weight of that horrific day. Since 9-11, Americans were robbed of their sense of safety, and the
American dream of tranquility was shattered. A general unease spread from the wreckage of the
World Trade Centers, and with the passing of time a keen sense of awareness about terrorism
took its place. The events of 9/11 have made US citizens fully cognizant that there are many
actors actively plotting the destruction of the US. Now, eight years later, Americans live with
the daily realization that such a heinous act could happen again, in some other unimaginable
form. For the US government, the past eight years have been marked with as many successes as
failures. The consequences of the inability of the US intelligence community to foresee the
international plot unfolding, within and outside of the homeland, resulted in a major
reorganization within the US government. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was
established on November 25, 2002, and was created solely to address US vulnerabilities
highlighted by the actions of nineteen al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. The DHS’ main responsibility
is to improve communication and information sharing among various intelligence-gathering
agencies, so another attempt to plan an attack like 9/11 on US soil would be foiled before it
materialized.
The US government would no longer be noncommittal in the face of terrorism, as it had
before 9/11. Clear messages were sent to terrorists on October 7th, 2001, through the US invasion
2

of Afghanistan, and subsequently on March 20th, 2003 through the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the
US’ stance on the War on Terrorism was effectively and clearly communicated to al-Qaeda and
throughout the rest of the world. The US might once have been labeled a paper tiger, but hitting
the US at the core of their financial and military symbols struck a nerve. The terrorist attacks of
2001 taught the US government a vital lesson, but the military campaigns of Afghanistan and
Iraq would demonstrate that the US had even more to learn about the newest military tactics and
techniques employed by the enemy, and how these tactics impacted on US military operations,
strategies, and policies.

Lessons Learned

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began on October, 7 2001 and is presently an ongoing campaign, was initially hailed a success. The Taliban were defeated and their influence
temporarily diminished as they fled to nearby Pakistan, or went into hiding elsewhere in
Afghanistan. It did not, however, take long for the Taliban to reorganize, and in 2003 militant
students actively reestablished their presence and influence in Afghanistan. The various Afghan
actors, responsible for rebuilding the country and providing security, had differing political
agendas and military strategies, which contributed to the worsening situation in Afghanistan.
The international community wanted positive change to take place, but was disappointed.
Afghanistan’s problems were overshadowed by the US involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) in March 2003. Once OIF started, the US government was more focused on capturing alQaeda operatives in Iraq, and taking down Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, than on dealing
with the emerging Taliban threat in Afghanistan.
3

Around the same time that OIF was being prosecuted, the Taliban were re-engaging n
Afghan’s politics. Simultaneously, the US and coalition military forces in OIF were embroiled in
low-level guerrilla warfare that ultimately grew to a strong insurgency in Iraq. The US took a
tough stance against the War on Terrorism and successful outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq are
critical to establishing legitimacy around the world regarding this issue. Therefore, it was vital
for the US government to establish hard-hitting policies and strategies that effectively and
concisely articulate the measures that need to be taken to successfully meet these goals. Crucial
mistakes were made regarding the policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which hampered progress
within these countries. The conclusions from this study, through the analysis of the policies and
strategies employed by the US to combat enemies that use suicide terrorism, could strengthen
future US policies and strategies in this area.
Such policies and strategies are especially important when combating an enemy that uses
PBIEDs in an unconventional type of war. Initially the US military was able to secure victories
in Afghanistan and Iraq using conventional warfare. Soon, however, these conventional methods
were increasingly unsuccessful when faced with an enemy that constantly changed tactics and
used asymmetric strategies. The inadequacies of the US policies and strategies to effectively
eradicate the insurgency led to increasing political instability and an inability to provide the
necessary security to the Afghan and Iraqi population.
The theoretical importance of this study will provide a better understanding of how the
US government and military assess and adapts to adverse situations. Throughout the Afghanistan
and Iraq wars the US had to demonstrate flexibility, and had to adapt their available resources to
sufficiently combat the unpredictable enemy. In light of the way their enemy was fighting, the
US military was forced to completely rethink strategies, operations, and tactics, and match their
4

enemies’ asymmetrical warfare with unconventional methods. As the War on Terrorism
continues, this change in mindset is significant, because the current methods of fighting are
presumably those of future counter-terrorist conflicts.

Related Literature

The Afghanistan and Iraq wars are both ongoing current events, and are contentious subjects
in the US and around the world. Numerous authors have researched and wrote articles and books
on the myriad of issues that these wars have created. This research study focuses on literature
pertaining to various theories behind what motivates suicide terrorists to give up their lives, kill
innocent bystanders, and simultaneously send a message from their group. In addition, US
government strategies and policies for the US military and for the counterinsurgency efforts, in
Afghanistan and Iraq, will be examined in the current literature available. The insurgency
movement, coupled with suicide terrorism, had a tremendous impact on the role the US military
played in these countries, and how effective US strategies and policies were to attain the
intended end goals. Time does not stand still and the wars continue in the Middle East, thus new
information surfaces and new theories are developed. The literature review will be presented in
chronological order and focuses on works written after September 11, 2001.
Joseph Nye Jr. discusses the military and national security strategies employed by the US
after the Iraq War, in his 2003 article “U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq.” In the attempt to
curb the development of nuclear weapon programs in hostile countries and to combat global
terrorism, the Bush administration’s national security strategy involved forming alliances with
5

numerous countries. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program can be seen as the catalyst to the
implementation of a US foreign policy that creates an alliance with China. Nye regards the
direction of the US’ national security strategy as a reflection of the challenges dominating world
politics. The author argues that US military power is crucial in regards to global stability and is
an integral part to responding to global terrorism. Combating transnational issues such as
terrorism requires a willingness to find solutions, and needs to be included in countries national
interests. The strategies and foreign policies of the US might be accepted through
multilateralism, which is a way for the US to legitimize its power. Nye stipulates that in order for
the strategy to be successful, the US needs to be more mindful of soft power and multilateral
cooperation than unilateralism. 1
In 2003 Norman Friedman’s book titled Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of
War, analyzes the topics of terrorism, how it relates to Afghanistan, and the new type of war
America is faced with after the events of 9/11. Friedman familiarizes the reader with the events
of 9/11, and introduces new information surrounding that day. Throughout several chapters the
author discusses America’s response to terrorism in recent history. Friedman describes how the
entire national counterterrorism apparatus is affected by major problems, and particularly
highlights the apparent lack of response to terrorist attacks and threats in the 1990s by the
Clinton Administration. His book covers the political turmoil in Afghanistan and describes the
country as a terrorist- sponsored state essentially ruled by Osama bin Laden. Friedman analyzes
the significant role the large numbers of foreign terrorists had on influencing politics of
Afghanistan. The author directs attention to the instrumental role al-Qaeda played in the Taliban
resistance, which he believes was more active than the US was aware of. Lastly, the book
introduces the topic on America’s new way of war. Written before the invasion of Iraq, Friedman
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compares the events in Afghanistan to the pending Iraq invasion. The author describes the
significance of modern warfare in Afghanistan, which strengthens the terrorists’ ability to curb
power projection. On this topic he also includes the role the Northern Alliance had in
Afghanistan. 2

In 2003, authors Williamson Murray and Robert Scales Jr. examine the Iraq war in a style
termed “new military history,” which puts military policy and strategy into the social and
political context; as such events don’t take place in a vacuum. Their book The Iraq War: A
Military History, analyzes the Iraq war through a military perspective, and examines the day-today operational decision making. In addition, the authors highlight the internal debates within the
US Defense Department regarding the right amount of military power to apply in each situation.
Murray and Scales describe the war as a campaign and examine what the strategic military goals
hoped to achieve within the different theaters of operation. Operation Iraqi Freedom was
planned to cause a total collapse of Saddam’s regime, through the simultaneous application of all
elements of military force. This was accomplished through a military campaign of air, ground,
naval, and special operations, targeted at the various arms of Saddam’s power, which included
the Ba’ath party, his internal security forces, and the Republican guard. The authors emphasized
that the mission was the destruction of Saddam’s regime, and to secure Baghdad quickly.
However, once it overran Iraq, the US military had to change tactics from policing to countering
guerilla operations. Murray and Scales discuss the implications of insurgency warfare, and the
insurgents’ perspective on what constitutes a win or a loss. The authors argue that there isn’t
enough military manpower to sufficiently ensure success in Iraq, and that in addition to precision
targeting the ability to quickly form tactical units is paramount. Currently such considerations
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are heavily weighed, and resources deployed depending on the severity of the situation. The
authors reveal the new American way of war through their in-depth military analysis. 3

Author Christoph Reuter examines the type of people who become suicide bombers, and how
they justify their actions in his 2004 book My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide
Bombing. He argues against the mainstream belief that suicide bombers are crazed fanatics or
simply brainwashed. Many of today’s martyrs are in fact well-educated young adults who
willingly decide to become human bombs. Their actions are perpetrated to seek revenge against
an enemy they perceived as unjust and oppressive. Reuter states that suicide terrorists, literally,
want their lives to make a difference and accept their deaths as a way to make their mark.
Martyrs are mostly motivated at the thought of being heroes, as opposed to some sort of religious
concept of a blissful afterlife. In the book the author investigates Sri Lanka, Chechnya,
Kurdistan, the 1980s childrens’ suicide brigades in the Iran-Iraq war, the activities of Hezbollah
in Lebanon, and the suicide activities in Israeli-occupied Palestine. Reuter describes how
Western governments unintentionally helped in the creation of al-Qaeda, and thereby helped
caused the globalization of suicide bombing. In his last chapter the author points out that due to a
new social environment in post-Khomeini Iran, suicide terrorism is being renounced, in a
country and society where it had once been enthusiastically embraced. 4

In his 2004 book The War after the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan,
Anthony Cordesman insists that even with the losses that the US military suffered in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there is optimism for the future. However, to achieve successes the US military
must apply the lessons already garnered from these two conflicts. Cordesman focuses his
analysis on the time frame prior to the war and how policies could have been reshaped. Some of
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the lessons learned from the two conflicts include the importance of internationalism and
effectively using international organizations; the integration of diplomacy in war strategy; and
the need for organizational reform. The author chronicles the military campaign up until April
2003 with a focus on the composition of forces. He explains the internal US government
disagreements concerning the right approach to take (either the use of the Powell Doctrine versus
the Rumsfeld Doctrine). Cordesman provides an analysis of where the military made mistakes in
their attempt at decreasing the violence and nation building. 5

In her book titled Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, Mia Bloom examines how
suicide bombing has been used in Asia, the Middle East, and in Europe in 2007. The author
analyzes the strategies that were taken by extremists, and the failures and successes of using
suicide terrorism. She assessed how effective the various governments were at responding to
such attacks. Bloom’s analysis begins by reviewing the history of terrorism, from Japan’s use of
kamikazes during World War II to the various forms of suicide terrorism that today’s terrorist
groups employ. The author describes that suicide terrorism is used because it instills fear in the
public, attracts the attention of the international media, allows the terrorist group’s cause to gain
additional support, and can create either competition or a union between various terrorist
organizations. Bloom explains how terrorist groups learn from their mistakes, as well as from
one another. She illustrates how these groups respond to counterterrorist measures and where the
terrorists receive their financial support. The author concludes that suicide bombers are socially
and politically motivated. 6
Kevin Desouza and Ting-Yen Wang discuss the tactics used by insurgents in Iraq in their
2007 article “Impeding Insurgents Attacks: The Information Management Agenda.” These
tactics caused many problems vies a vies the economic and political reforms that the coalition
9

forces were trying to introduce. Desouza and Wang highlight the arsenal of strategies being
employed by the insurgents, which range from suicide bombings to kidnappings. This created a
tense atmosphere between the local factions and the Iraqi people, but also caused a divide
between the local Iraqis and the coalition forces. The strategies employed by the insurgents gave
them more power against their military targets due to the nature of their attacks, which are highly
erratic and very dangerous. Unfortunately coalition forces are unable to use a full force assault,
because the insurgents hide themselves amongst the populace and exploit the advantages of this
guerrilla warfare tactic. The article draws attention to the informational issues that the coalition
forces need to understand, so they can not only try to control the extent of insurgents’ attacks but
most importantly decrease the number of attacks. Desouza and Wang believe that the number
one strategy against the insurgency violence is to use information effectively. The side that is
better at managing and disseminating information, with the goal of using it to influence their
opponent, will succeed. 7
The issue that policymakers are facing when formulating counterterrorist strategies,
according to author Robert Brym, is that policymakers don’t seem to be on the same page as
researchers investigating suicide terrorism. In his 2007 article “Six Lessons of Suicide Bombers,”
Brym wrote that over the last twenty five years researcher have come to understand more about
the motivations of suicide bombers, the reason for organizations to support them, suicide
bombers’ methods of operation, the catalysts of suicide attacks, and how counterterrorism
strategies effect insurgent behavior. In addition, Brym illustrates to the reader how traditional
explanations attempt to analyze the reasons behind suicide bombings, but get it wrong. 8
Attaining victory in Iraq was supposed to be easy; however Iraq entered a bloody civil war
after the US “liberation.” According to author Mohammed Hafez, time will only tell the
10

duration, scope, and magnitude of this second internal war. In his 2007 book titled Suicide
Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, Hafez illustrates how once again
Islamic resistance has successfully gone up against the remaining superpower and posed itself as
a serious threat. The insurgents’ current achievements and their prior victory against the Soviet
Union in the 80s cemented the notion that Islamic resistance and martyrdom can bring down the
United States. The author explains that the targets of the suicide attacks are predominantly the
Shia population and Iraqi security forces, not the coalition forces.
Comprised of volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Europe, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, and North
Africa, the insurgents did not have many Iraqi members. The book details the Iraqi insurgency’s
attempts at preventing the US from 1) stabilizing the country, 2) establishing a democratic
regime in Iraq, and 3) creating a new US ally in the Middle East. Hafez writes of the importance
to understanding suicide terrorism in connection with US national security, US foreign policy in
the Muslim world, and the war on terrorism. The author details the Iraqi insurgency and
examines the ethnic background of the movement. Additionally he explores the history of suicide
bombing in Iraq and throughout other countries, the theoretical perspectives on suicide bombing,
and the ideology and theology behind martyrdom supporting suicide bombers. Hafez predicts
that the events in Iraq will shape and influence a third generation of transnational jihadists. 9
In her 2007 article, “Engaging or withdrawing, winning or losing?,” Andrea Lopez analyzes
US military policies in both Afghanistan and Iraq. By comparing and contrasting the US
military’s policies in both of these war zones, the author illustrates how the approaches are very
different in each country. In order to create a powerful presence, the US in 2003 established
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout Afghanistan. Also, instead of being an
active presence in Iraq, the US military withdrew from the cities, and secured themselves in
11

military camps. Even though the situation worsened in 2005-2006, Lopez agrees with the policy
of establishing PRTs and believes that more should be created, with the military deploying the
additional personnel to support such an effort. Combining this counterinsurgency theory and
military doctrine will help win the support of the local population in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
In Iraq, the author explains, the situation was made worse through the US military’s action of
consolidating their bases, which goes against counterinsurgency policies and theory. She argues
this decision might keep the soldiers safer, but it creates a power vacuum allowing for potential
guerrilla activity. Lopez describes the trend of US policy failures, before and after 2003, in
regards to the US government’s counterinsurgency approach. 10
Authors Lee Hamilton, Bruce Hoffman, and Michael Jenkins analyze the US front against
global terrorism. In their 2007 book State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle Against Global
Terrorism, they contend that the West’s position against the war on terrorism is eroding instead
of improving. The authors concede that the US has achieved tactical successes and ensures the
continued protection of the US homeland, but say that the future is riddled with even more
dangerous and unstable environments due to the increase in radicalization. The book assesses the
vital necessity of counterterrorism strategies and the West’s progress in this regard. It discusses
the issues of balancing security, creating practical counterterrorism coalitions and strategies, and
contending with the threat of terrorists acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
Hamilton, Hoffman, and Jenkins illustrate the US’ effective campaign in neutralizing the
insurgents in Afghanistan in 2001 and the need to readdress the issue because of the return of
insurgent activity. The authors turn their analysis to Iraq and explain how the country could
become not only a breeding ground for terrorists, but also serve as a training base where the
experienced insurgents would be dispersed throughout Europe. Additionally, the book explores
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years of recent suicide terrorism activity, how influential al-Qaeda’s perceived accomplishments
are, and the challenges the US faces when contending with a threat that is growing faster than
their ability to respond. Hamilton, Hoffman, and Jenkins emphasize the need for viable longterm policy solutions, and as they thus far have been unsuccessful, they believe solutions can be
found outside of the current military strategies. 11
In a 2008 interview with Craig Kennedy titled “Iraq's Past, Present and Future” the article
candidly discusses the US military’s role in Iraq’s civil war with Former Iraqi minister of trade
and minister of defense Ali A. Allawi. It portrays to the reader the many different actors involved
in the civil war, including al-Qaeda and Iranian influence, and highlights some of the US
government and US military’s strategic failures in their attempt at establishing a government and
security in Iraq. Additionally, the article delves into the social conditions resulting from the civil
war. 12
Authors Farhana Ali and Jerrold Post explore the contested concept of martyrdom, which is
being pervasively used by terrorist groups in their jihadist struggle against the West and its
influences. Their 2008 study “The History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of
Defensive Jihad: An Analysis of Suicide Bombers in Current Conflicts,” analyzes how the
Islamic concept of martyrdom, a legitimate religious concept, is transformed into the acceptable
use of suicide terrorism by terrorist groups. The authors argue that the original concept of
martyrdom is being misappropriated by extremists, and is thereby violating Islamic principles.
By redefining two Islamic terms, martyrdom and jihad, to fit their own agendas, extremists not
only create a tension between the West and Muslims, but also damage the authenticity of the
Islamic concepts. Ali and Post highlight that the global Islamic community is aware of the
importance of restoring the fundamental values of classical Islam, thereby eradicating extremist
13

ideologies. The authors are cognizant that reversing the damages done by extremists and
strengthening moderate Islam will take the commitment and coordination of many Islamic
groups, communities, and countries to defeat suicide terrorism permanently. 13
In 2008 Gilles Kepel describes in his book Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the
Middle East, the clashing points of view emanating from the West and the Middle East that have
come to a head since the events in 2001. To the neoconservatives, the threat lies in the Islamic
terrorist robbing them of civilized life, and the jihadist goes after the myth of martyrdom by
killing the infidels or non believers. Not only is the battle is being waged on the battleground, but
also through the use of a media smear campaigns. In addition, both sides continue to oppose one
another, as evidenced by the deaths in London and Madrid by suicide bombers and by the
American military forces killing Iraqi population. The author reveals the Bush administration’s
complex Middle East political agenda, through the establishment of a democratic government,
appraising the significance of Iraqi oil, and securing Israel. He explores the potential of a regime
change in Iran. Kepel also writes how al-Qaeda’s jihad and call for martyrs has divided the
Islamic world, so that it is even waging war against itself. The author raises the issue that time is
of the essence for the West and the Islamic community to establish a meaningful dialog. This
conversation needs to take place in order for democratic change to occur in the Middle East, as
well as to unite Islam. In order for these new dialogues to be constructive, Kepel believes that
the conversations should stay away from the old concepts of terrorism and martyrdom, and start
afresh, perhaps in Europe which has a growing Muslim population. 14
Baghdad and its neighboring provinces are experiencing a lower level of violence due to the
military surge initiated by the US in the middle of 2007. Judith Yaphe explores how military
strategy is not sufficient to restore stability in Iraq, in her 2008 article titled “After the Surge:
14

The Next Steps in Iraq?” A measure of security has been restored to Western Iraq and in
Baghdad, yet more needs to be done to establish stability and to keep the country from
unraveling. Even with the surge at its midpoint, the Iraqi government did not show signs of
political reconciliation. In addition to the political stalemate Yaphe addresses the other
challenges that lie ahead for Iraqi politics. She describes the upcoming provincial election, the
contentious census, and the referendum to determine who will govern oil-rich Kirkuk, as
potentially volatile situations. 15
The opinions vary, according to the different authors’ perspectives, on the subjects of suicide
terrorism and the US policy and military strategy concerning the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
Gilles Kepel and Michael Jenkins, et al, each focus on an aspect of US political agenda on the
War on Terrorism. Kepel believes that the ideologies Islam and the US have towards terrorism
need to be addressed in a new perspective; this will help both sides become aware of the steps
that need to take place for the US and the Middle East to accomplish their respective goals.
Jenkins shares Kepel’s sentiment that the US’s current strategies on the War on Terrorism need
to be revised. Both authors discuss the courses of action the Bush administration took in the
Middle East, which includes establishing democratic governments and counterterrorism
strategies. The authors reach a similar conclusion and offer the advice that the US needs to
change tactics and try a different direction. Perhaps the solutions could be found in dialogues that
take a different approach, and go beyond the established military strategies.
Authors Reuter and Bloom discuss the history of suicide terrorism in different countries
around the world, and highlight the various motivations behind these nefarious actors. Reuter
describes a suicide terrorist’s need to be thought of as a hero when he or she seeks revenge
against their enemy. Bloom illustrates that suicide attacks are motivated to gain international
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media attention, which assists in perpetuating fear in the public. The author discusses how
terrorists learn from each other, and from the mistakes they make. This is goes in the same vein
as Reuter’s thought, when he describes the globalization of suicide bombing. Both authors
discuss the role the US played in suicide terrorism. Where Reuter addresses the US’ hand in alQaeda’s growth and the terrorist group’s part in global suicide terrorism; Bloom examines how
effectively governments respond to suicide terrorist attacks.
Whereas Reuter and Bloom focused more on the global history of suicide terrorism and the
various reasons why suicide bombers are compelled to take their own lives; authors Brym,
Hafez, and Ali analyzed the policies and strategies employed by the US, the insurgents, and
suicide terrorists. Brym believes that policymakers need to be as knowledgeable on suicide
terrorism as researchers investigating the topic. This would make a difference to how
counterterrorist strategies are created by policymakers. Hafez also believes that it is important to
understand suicide terrorism, and how it is relevant to US policies regarding politics in the
Middle East and the War on Terrorism. The author also focuses on the role suicide terrorism
plays in Iraq’s civil war. Like Reuter and Bloom, he believes that history taught the insurgents
the strategies they are currently employing in Iraq. The insurgents saw the success the
mujahedeen had against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 80’s. Therefore, they choose
to use martyrdom as a weapon against their enemies. Like Hafez, Ali examines martyrdom and
explains how suicide terrorist organizations are redefining the concept to fit their political
agendas.
Authors Allawi, Yaphe , and Cordesman focus on how the US went awry with the US
polices and strategies implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq. Allawi contends that US policy
failures led to the failure to establish a government and security in Iraq. Yahphe too, offers a
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negative assessment of the situation in Iraq. In her article she writes that the current military
strategies alone won’t fully restore political stability. Yaphe discusses the successes that have
taken place, (as the violence decreased considerably in 2007), but something else needs to
accompany the military strategies for stability to fully take hold. Cordesman offers some hope
for the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. He believes the US military can learn from the
mistakes it made, and reshape the policies to address its deficiencies. All authors agree that
change in policies or strategies are a necessary step so the US can achieve its goals.
Nye, Murray, Scales, and Lopez address the US military strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Nye takes a broader perspective on the topic, and analyzes how the US policies are reflective of
the tone emanating from the global political arena. The author warns the US that it needs to be
more aware of using soft power, and attaining the goals within their policies through multilateral
cooperation. Military experts Murray and Scales steer away from Nye’s broad approach and
instead focus on the daily operational decisions that were made in Iraq. They highlight how the
US military needed to adapt to the tactics used by the insurgents. No longer was conventional
warfare the optimal decision when encountering guerilla warfare. Murray and Scales lament that
more soldiers are necessary to attain long term success in Iraq. Lopez includes both Afghanistan
and Iraq in her analysis of US military policies. She believes that the military bases need not be
confined to one area, which assists in keeping soldiers safer, but by doing so creates an
environment where insurgents think they can influence the social environment. The authors are
unanimous on the fact that the US needs to improve the policies that focus on counterinsurgency,
in the global War on Terrorism.
Desouza, Wang, and Friedman review the impact of the insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Desouza and Wang review the strategies used by the insurgents in Iraq, and how the US military
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was unable to use their full might, due to the fact that the battle field is entwined with innocent
civilians. The authors believe that the US can improve the strategies for collecting and
disseminating information. If this is corrected, the amount of violence should decrease. Friedman
also analyzes insurgency activity, but does so in Afghanistan. He discusses the role of the
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan’s politics. However, Friedman blames the broken
intelligence institutions, and past administrations’ lack of attention to global terrorist issues.
Desouza, Wang, and Friedman illustrate the importance of curbing the insurgencies influences
on political, social, and security issues in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Offering a Different Approach

Today’s political environment has created an onslaught of literature relating to suicide
terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the US global War on Terrorism. The authors
showcased in this literature review offered their perspectives and the conclusions resulting from
their research. Whatever their topic, the authors attempted to come up with an explanation on the
motivation of suicide terrorists or why the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq are taking more
time than anticipated to improve. The authors offered their suggestions as to how policies and
strategies could be improved, so the US can establish political stability and more adequately
provide security. However, a research study has not been conducted that analyzes if the US
adapted its policies and military strategies due to suicide terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. The
purpose of this research study will fill that gap, and examine the impact suicide terrorism has on
US policies and military strategies.
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The frequency as to which terrorist groups around the world are implementing suicide
terrorism in their weapons arsenal, indicates a trend that the global community needs to be aware
of. By examining how the US government dealt with suicide terrorism, will hopefully strengthen
our nation’s ability to cope with this growing threat. The advances of technology make for a
smaller world and with it the ability for more people around the world to communicate with each
other. Terrorist organizations are taking the benefits of globalization to their advantage. They are
redefining global boundaries and exerting their influence all over the world. The global
community needs to follow course, and use the benefits of having a globalized world. Together,
through dialogue and tougher policies the global community needs to take a united stance against
terrorists.

Process of Examination

This study is divided into four chapters and will provide a subject analysis. The first chapter
introduces the thesis and the topic that will be analyzed. The second chapter takes a historical
perspective, and examines how the US became involved in the War on Terrorism. This chapter
also provides an in-depth look at the various actors currently involved in the US’ campaign on
the global War on Terrorism. The September 11th attacks left the US wondering why al-Qaeda
harbors so much hatred against the US. It is important to have a better understanding of the
political ideologies that drive Osama bin Laden’s agenda against the US and the West. As
Afghanistan was the first battle ground on the war against terrorism, understanding the country’s
history, specifically the outcome of the Soviet-Afghan war, is significant. So too is some general
knowledge on the Taliban, the role they play in harboring al-Qaeda, and the impact they have on
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Afghanistan’s politics. Not to be left out are the US decisions to go to war in Iraq, and the
unforeseen impact of the insurgency on establishing a government and providing security.
Lastly, this chapter brings the reader full circle, back to the unraveling situation in Afghanistan.
In chronological order the third chapter will compare key strategic goals within the US
policies and military strategies, presented through the 2002 and 2006 US NSS, and the 2001 and
2006 QDR. Statistics specifically focusing on the trends of PBIED and SVBIED related attacks
in Afghanistan and Iraq will be used. This data will come from the NCTC’s 2008 Report on
Terrorism. The last chapter will present the conclusion from the analysis of the third chapter
regarding the impact suicide terrorism had on the US policies and military strategies in
Afghanistan and Iraq. From the conclusion reached through the analysis, this chapter will expand
on the importance of learning from the past.
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CHAPTER II: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

America plunged into the Global War against Terrorism: The events of 9/11

Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, most Americans knew little about al-Qaeda or
the political events that took place in Afghanistan and Iraq. Americans lived blissfully unaware
that a network of men were plotting to destroy our country’s sense of freedom, and were
coordinating their attacks in another country, half way around the world. 9-11, as it would later
be coined, made al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden a household name, and illustrated to the United
States that not everyone thinks highly of our country or agrees with our way of life. Whereas it
might have been the first time most Americans heard of Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda
had previous experience dealing with Americans, more specifically with the US military. Bin
Laden’s name was not unfamiliar to the US government either, as the US military assisted
mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan in the 80’s during the Soviet-Afghanistan war. Historical
settings and societal factors are significant facilitators that make up the preconditions of terrorist
activity that set the stage for terrorism over the long run. 16 In an effort to explain the hatred of
radical Islamic groups, such as al-Qaeda, towards the United States and the West; it is important
to understand their background. In this case we begin with the history of Osama bin Laden,
because the events and people that influenced him eventually helped him create al-Qaeda, which
in turn significantly impacted the US through their terrorist tactics on that fateful day in
September.
According to Osama bin Laden himself, he grew up with a hatred for America because it
is “part of the Muslim religion to hate Americans, Christians, and Jews.” 17 And in bin Laden’s
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opinion all adult Muslims feel this way. 18 After a youth that did not live up to pious standards,
bin Laden stopped binge drinking and chasing after woman, once he entered the King Abdul
Aziz University in Jeddah, and embarked on a new path that adhered to the teachings of Islam,
specifically the sect of Wahabbism. His Islamic Studies professor introduced him to the writings
of Sayyid Qutb, who purportedly is the father of modern Islamic fundamentalism, which
influenced bin Laden. 19 He also met Abdullah Azzam, a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood,
whose idea it was to organize a central recruiting station for jihad in Pakistan during the SovietAfghan war, known as Mekhtab al-Khadamat “the Office of the Services.” 20 Azzam’s role as a
mentor to bin Laden played a large part in Osama’s decision to actively take part in the situation
in Afghanistan. 21 Azzam’s political ideology influenced bin Laden to help coordinate the
recruitment of thousands of young Muslims from around the world to fight in Afghanistan, but
also contributed finances and assisted the recruiting office with military issues. 22 About 10,000
Muslims recruits from Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Egypt, known as the Afghan Arabs, would
later become an integral part of bin Laden’s future terrorist organization, as they were among his
most loyal supporters. 23 In 1979 the billionaire’s son, who was himself worth roughly $80
million through the inheritance he received from the earnings of his deceased father’s
construction company, answered the call of jihad to join in liberating Muslim Afghans from the
invasion of eighty-five thousand Soviet troops. 24 Osama bin Laden fought and led well and he
earned his place among the ranks of jihadists warding off the Soviets in Afghanistan. During one
battle, he was wounded by shrapnel in a battle at Jalalabad airport. 25 This would later enhance
his image as his combat experience gave him the credibility to become “Emir of al-Qaeda.”
Osama bin Laden’s time in Afghanistan was pivotal, because through Azzam he became
acquainted with Ayman al-Zawahiri, and it was during this time he came to the conclusion that
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to bring the mighty western superpowers to their knees one did not need sophisticated weaponry,
but faith in the jihad. 26 Both Al-Zawahiri and bin Laden shared the same goals for what could be
accomplished through jihad, and had a more grandiose vision by expanding jihad on a global
scale. They both wanted to go against “kafir countries, and against apostate Muslim leaders, such
as Egypt and Lybia.” 27 Gradually Azzam’s leadership role of Mekhtab al-Khadamat “the Office
of the Services” became obsolete and in 1989 he was killed in a mysterious car explosion. 28
Together bin Laden and al-Zawahiri would use the structure of Mekhtab al-Khadamat as the
foundation for al-Qaeda.
A victorious Bin Laden returned home after assisting the Afghans in defeating the Soviet
Union. Impressively, the rag tag army of mujahedeens and Afghan rebel fighters defeated the
Red Army and the powerful Soviet Union. However, they could not have pulled off this victory
without the assistance from the US. Throughout both the Carter and Reagan administration, $700
million worth of military equipment and food supplies were delivered to those fighting in
Afghanistan to stop the US’ Cold War enemy from taking over the country. 29 Osama was barely
back from Afghanistan when Saddam Hussein’s army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The
distressed Saudi kingdom reached out to the US government to aid them in stopping Hussein’s
army from reaching their country, as well as get the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. Bin Laden pleaded
with the Saudi’s royal government to let his mujahedeen warriors fight Saddam Hussein, and not
allow non-Muslims to fight for them, saying the US military was unnecessary. 30 Bin Laden
failed to see that the one hundred thousand fighters he wanted to contribute was no match in
warding off the Iraqi Army, which consisted of millions of soldiers, and also had superior
warfare technology. 31 The decision of the Saudi royal government, to enlist the help of infidels,
gave him further proof that the long reaching influence of the US and the West within the Middle
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East had to be stopped. Therefore, the US had to be destroyed, bringing an end to apostate
leaders in the Middle East, with the end goal of creating a pan-Islamic state under shariah law. 32
The condition for Osama bin Laden’s decision to wage war against the United States
stemmed from the US’ involvement in Middle Eastern politics. Even though bin Laden didn’t
agree with US military presence during the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait
threatened both Saudi Arabia and US national security, and their interests lay in defending Saudi
Arabia’s vast oil wealth from the hands of Iraq’s tyrannical dictator. Al-Qaeda’s leader
vehemently disagrees with America’s position with Israel, and feels that the Muslims in Palestine
are being massacred, and that the US is the real terrorist. 33 The fact that the Saudi royal familyfollowers of Islam-were allowing the US military into the country that had two of the holiest
cities to Muslims, made the Saudi kingdom an additional target for bin Laden. 34 Therefore, the
Saudi rulers felt compelled to throw him out of the country in 1992, because of his plans to
overthrow the government and put in its place a true Islamic regime. Two years later Saudi
Arabia revoked bin Laden’s citizenship, and by that time he sought refuge in Sudan. The current
Sudanese President allowed known international criminals to reside freely in the country.
Bin Laden continued to cultivate relationships in Afghanistan, all the while creating a
semblance of a life in Sudan. However, this too came to an end when he was forced to leave the
country due to the US pressuring the Sudanese government to expel Osama bin Laden. Through
his large network, Osama made a seamless transition when he returned to Afghanistan, and he
aligned himself with the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar in a cunning strategy. In exile,
and still seeing little notable change in the Middle Eastern political area, the volume and hatred
in bin Laden’s anti-American rhetoric increased dramatically. Finding fault in the lack of action
by his former Saudi rulers and other Middle Eastern Muslim governments for not making a
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difference and bringing about necessary political, economic, and social changes, bin Laden
issued a fatwa in line with his political and moral duty. 35
In the 1998 fatwa Osama bin Laden stated it was the duty of all Muslims to kill as many
Americans as possible. This fatwa was issued against the backdrop of increasing numbers of,
infidels in holy Muslim territory. 36 Bin Laden wanted his country to have less western influence
and presence and be more focused on returning to a golden age of piety. 37 As all concerned later
painfully learned, a threat from bin Laden should not be easily dismissed, as by this time alQaeda had established a pattern for violence, especially toward the US. The terrorist group had
already started a global terror campaign against the US which came as early as 1992 in the form
of the hotel bombings in Yemen which targeted US troops; thankfully in this incident there were
no fatalities. However, a year later, 18 soldiers died in another attack by al-Qaeda. 38 And the
mastermind behind the 1995 WTC bombing was now within the folds of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda
coordinated the attacks of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and in Dar-eSalaam, Tanzania, through bin Laden’s creation of the Internationalist Islamic Front, which
consisted of a variety of smaller Islamist groups from Egypt to India that supported him. 39 The
bombings in Africa were symbolically planned for August 7th, as this was the day Saudi King
Fahd allowed the United States to help defend the kingdom of Saudi Arabia against Saddam
Hussein. 40 Osama’s message was driven home by killing 224 people and injuring over four
thousand more.
Al-Qaeda took responsibility for attacking the United States’ warship the U.S.S. Cole in
2000 while it was refueling in Aden, Yemen. The apparent reason behind the attack was for the
terrorist group to test the military might of the United States. During this terrorist attack, 17 US
Navy sailors died and 39 were injured. 41 Bin Laden supposedly stated of the attack, “the
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destroyer represents the capital of the West, and the small boat represents Mohammed.” 42 After
the attack on the naval ship, the US government’s investigation led to no concrete evidence, and
there were no active attempts to punish those who committed this violent act. Unhindered by the
US, al-Qaeda was free to plan their next attack on America. America failed the test and the
ramifications of what this group was capable became apparent a year later.
Osama carefully planned his next attacks to aggressively hit the US’ military, economic,
and political centers of gravity. By targeting the heart of the West, the attacks on the World
Trade Center, Pentagon, and possibly the White House on September 11, 2001 led credence to
Osama bin Laden’s hatred of Western institutions. In a letter to Americans three months after
the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden explained the reasons for committing these acts of terror, and
justified that it was necessary and acceptable. He stated that the West and specifically the United
States was leading a crusade against Islam. 43 Bin Laden believed that the actions of the US’
foreign policy is one of injustice and aggression, and is directed specifically at Muslims, because
to the US they are of no value. 44 His additional grievances include the US turning its back on
Palestine, instead of helping to support oppressed Palestinian children. The letter continues that
the US is not doing anything positive for Palestine, and together the American-Zionist lobby will
stop at nothing to kill the Arab children. 45 Ultimately, bin Laden’s goals for al-Qaeda, is for the
voices of Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Philippines, Kashmir, Chechnya, Somalia, Bosnia, and
south Sudan to be heard. 46 Therefore, it is up to every Muslim man to stand up against tyrannical
rulers and defend these helpless Muslims. To accomplish this goal the jihad must continue
against the United States by hitting it militarily and economically until it is weak. 47 Upon
hearing this he thought that millions of Americans would react and demonstrate in the streets
against their government, resulting in Congress splintering and becoming obsolete. In bin
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Laden’s eyes this would create an economic collapse and with it the end of the American nation,
thus fulfilling the ultimate objective of al-Qaeda. 48
The US’ retaliation came swiftly, as to send a concise message that this blatant act of
terrorism on the homeland would be met with the full fury of the US military. In response to the
events of September 11th the US unveiled a new foreign security; preemptive self-defense. This
policy reserved the US the right to “strike preemptively against states only in the face of a risk
that terrorists would acquire weapons of mass destruction” or in the case that America’s national
security is threatened. 49 Osama bin Laden effectively awoke the slumbering dragon, and the war
against terrorism became the US government’s new rally cry. The war against terrorism in
Afghanistan, code named Operation Enduring Freedom, began on October 7, 2001 with the goal
of capturing Osama bin Laden and ousting the Taliban regime. The new US foreign policy
dictated that it had a right to go after terrorist groups and governments that harbored them. 50

US Retaliation in Afghanistan

Significant combat against terrorism began in Afghanistan because that is where the
Afghan Taliban allowed al-Qaeda safe haven. More significantly the 2001 terrorist attacks were
planned in Afghanistan under the watch of this religious extremist regime. Therefore, the US
held both al-Qaeda and the Taliban responsible for the atrocities of September 11th. The Taliban,
Afghanistan’s authoritarian government, comprised of extremely religious Pashtuns from
Afghanistan and western Pakistan, knowingly permitted al-Qaeda to actively pursue their antiAmerican activities. However, the target for the US military’s reprisal against al-Qaeda might
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not have been in Afghanistan if the US government had not turned a blind eye to Taliban
activities during the early 90’s. Additionally, the Taliban’s later succession to power might have
been hindered if the US had not been as generous in their financial and military support to the
mujahedeen, during the Soviet-Afghan war, and had greater oversight over the recipients of the
finances. 51
In the height of the Cold War tensions between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) were high. Leonid Brezhnev, serving as General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, ordered the Red Army to advance into Afghanistan in December
1979. The Russians had covertly supported a coup in 1973 that overthrew King Zahir Shah, and
placed Mohammed Daoud as the head of the new Afghani Communist government. 52 However,
only five years later the actors within Daoud’s communist army, who once assisted him to
achieve power, overthrew the President in a coup. They subsequently massacred Daoud, his
family, and the Presidential Bodyguard. 53 The antagonists of the coup were deeply divided and
therefore caused serious political problems. Afghans led revolts against the coup leaders because
they failed to understand Afghanistan’s complex society. 54 Consequently religious community
leaders, within Afghanistan, ordered a holy war to free their country of the communist
influence. 55 As the violence between the various actors drew to a head the Soviet Red Army
invaded the country to protect their interests, and installed a new leader as President, Babrak
Karmal. 56
The Soviet Union had emerged from World War II a powerful political opponent. The
Communist government threatened US foreign policy with Russia’s growing capability to
advance its sphere of influence and ideology onto neighboring countries. Therefore, when the
USSR invaded Afghanistan the US government felt compelled to stop the ever- advancing Soviet
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Union and the threat of Communism. Together the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) supported the recruitment of Afghan religious
extremists to fight against the Soviet’s Red Army in Afghanistan. 57 The CIA took the lead in
recruiting these men from all over the Middle East and North Africa. 58 It was during this time
period that Azzam and bin Laden were initiating their own recruitment efforts through Mekhtab
al-Khadamat. Additionally, Bin Laden received the support of the Saudi royal family to fight in
the resistance. In return he would play as the kingdom’s mouthpiece and spread the Wahabbi
ideology throughout Afghanistan’s political arena. 59
The aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan war led to the establishment of an Afghan Interim
Government (AIG) in 1989. However, it started off on shaky footing amid the different political
actors. Mohammed Najibullah’s rule as Afghanistan’s communist President ended on April
1992, when the mujahedeen effectively took over Kabul and announced that it was an Islamic
state. 60 Najibullah would be subsequently hung in the streets of Kabul in 1996, after being
tortured and killed by the Taliban. 61 In June 1992 Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the
mujahedeen group Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) became AIG’s transitional President. His
rival Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the mujahedeen group Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), was
assigned the role as Premier. Hekmatyar contended Rabbani’s position and did not want to share
power with him or the other mujahedeen leaders. In his struggle for power he assaulted Kabul for
many years with rockets, which resulted in crippling Kabul. 62 As a result Kabul’s defenses were
severely weakened, making the Taliban’s subsequent takeover of the city much easier. 63
While the political actors in the AIG were finding it difficult to work together, and
simultaneously as a mujahedeen power struggle was making the interim government ineffective,
the Taliban came into the political arena. By the fall of 1995 the Taliban controlled all of
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western Afghanistan. 64 The cities of Qandahar and Charasiab fell to the Taliban, and the Taliban
were eventually successful at taking control of Kabul a year later. 65 On April 4, 1996 Mullah
Mohammed Omar was appointed Amir ul-Mominen or Leader of the Faithful. 66 He used
religion to legitimize his leadership, stating that he was chosen by God, and effectively
established a new government authority in Afghanistan. In front of a Taliban audience he used
the removal of the Cloak of the Prophet as evidence of this ordained right. 67 For the next several
years the Afghan people were subjected to a severe form of Sharia law imposed by the Taliban.
The Taliban had been formed to “restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and
defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.” 68 The Taliban brought anything but
peace, and instead subjected the Afghan population to a brutal authoritarian regime.
The Taliban’s growth had been fostered in an effort to quash the US’ Cold War rival’s
expansionist goals. The US government directly but unintentionally spearheaded the creation of
a future enemy by putting the financial oversight in Pakistan’s hands. Under President Carter’s
administration, and the subsequent White House administrations, the ISI was responsible for the
oversight and distribution of monies and weapons to the various actors fighting against the
Soviet Union. Over the next ten years Pakistan’s intelligence service acted as intermediary of
US funds and arms, and distributed them to the mujahedeen fighting jihad against the Russians. 69
The question arises as to how much funding the Taliban received from ISI. The US did not
enforce any controls as to how the ISI chose to distribute money, and who received the finances.
US aid was initially accepted to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. However, once the
war ended it can be assumed the remaining finances were used to further political goals for the
various warlords and the insurgency in Afghanistan. The Soviet-Afghan war and the US’
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interests at keeping its Cold War enemy in check resulted in the emergence of the Taliban to the
international political arena.

US Political Leaders draw the US military into the Iraqi War

Osama bin Laden was still on the run, despite the US military’s efforts to locate him. To
the US, the blow that had been inflicted by the terrorist attacks on 9/11 was still a gaping wound.
It served to illustrate that the invincible America did have its share of vulnerabilities. The Bush
Doctrine demonstrated US fear that it might one day become a target again. To prevent
becoming a target once more, the Bush Doctrine prescribed the use of a preemptive defense
strategy that allowed the US to take down a perceived threat before the threat could inflict harm
on the US. The US leadership resolved that never again would the US be so blatantly attacked.
Therefore, when the Bush Administration received information, albeit incorrect, that al-Qaeda
and Saddam Hussein were working together, this was perceived as a threat to US national
security. Under the new criteria that asserted preemptive self defense, the US government would
not allow these two individuals to have the opportunity to hatch any plans against the US. The
fear of a partnership between these two actors was the knowledge that al-Qaeda had been busy
trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Saddam Hussein reportedly had in huge
stockpiles around Iraq. In order to protect US national security the US government eliminated
Saddam Hussein as a threat in the subsequent invasion of Iraq titled Operation Iraqi Freedom,
which started on March 20, 2003.
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By the time the US went to war in Iraq most Americans believed the pronouncements
from the Bush administration regarding Iraq. 70 However, there was some validity to President
Bush’s reasons for invading Iraq, which was that the Iraqi people would be better off without the
tyrannical ruler. Saddam Hussein was a brutal leader and had a known history of human rights
abuses against his own people. In speeches to justify going to war President Bush highlighted
how Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds. 71 However, the President
failed to mention that under Reagan and his father’s administration the US pointedly ignored
Saddam’s actions because the US was trying to foster a better relationship with the dictator in it’s
balance of power against Iran. 72 The real message the Bush administration was emphatically
trying to establish with the American public was that the Iraqi ruler had a connection to alQaeda. 73 With this information the White House allowed the public to assume that perhaps the
dictator was also responsible in some way for 9/11. Saddam Hussein was put in America’s
crosshairs soon after 9/11 and President Bush reached out for congressional authorization to go
to war in September 2002, which was quickly endorsed only a month later. 74 In light of the
events of 9/11, President Bush was counting on the public having strong feelings about removing
Saddam Hussein from power. In reality there was only the smallest tangible thread connecting
Saddam to 9/11, despite the appearance of an Iraqi partnership with Osama bin Laden. 75
With the full support of the American public the US President sent the troops into Iraq, in
March 2003, to destroy the “Axis of Evil.” Most Americans fully backed the war, due to the
high emotional toll the terrorist attacks had on peoples’ lives. However, the Bush Administration
made that decision to go to war without ever actually haven seen any evidence that truly linked
Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden or having an accurate number of WMDs the Iraqi ruler
reportedly had. 76 Apparently the Bush Administration was basing its intent to go to war with
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Iraq on the old evidence that the Iraqi dictator never adhered to fully disarming, as stipulated in a
UN resolution. 77 Additionally, no one raised the argument that Saddam Hussein would not give
al-Qaeda WMD, as he represented a secular Islamic regime which the terrorist group had sworn
to destroy. 78 President Bush did not agree with this argument and vehemently believed that given
the opportunity Saddam Hussein would give WMDs to a terrorist group, such as al-Qaeda, so
that Iraq’s enemies would be harmed. 79
If the truth for going to war didn’t rest in the fact that Saddam Hussein supported alQaeda, then what remains in the equation is the possibility that Saddam might have had WMDs.
Perhaps the Bush administration realized that America would not agree to spend money on a war
when they lacked tangible evidence, Saddam’s vast array of WMD, to present to the public. The
US was fairly quick to dismiss the UN weapon inspectors, which Saddam had personally invited
on September 16, 2002, and assert that a much faster time table was necessary. 80 Tensions were
heightened regarding nuclear weapons during this time period as the US was also dealing with
the threat of North Korea continuing its nuclear research program. 81 No matter what the Bush
administration’s real intention for invading Iraq, six years later the US military continues the
bloody fight in Iraq, which according to then Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was to have been an
assuredly easy victory.
The US military choose an effects-based warfare of Shock and Awe that would quickly
oust Saddam Hussein and put Iraq in American control, so a new government could be elected
and established. 82 Apparently senior military officials were of the mindset that Iraq was going to
be a quick victory, requiring only a small amount of soldiers to overthrow Saddam Hussein and
establish the new government. 83 The military strategy of Shock and Awe can be explained as the
shock of the campaign coming from the might of US military capabilities, which results in the
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population being awed at the power of the American military, thus quickly surrendering. 84 The
Pentagon was truly surprised when the quick win in Iraq did not occur. Instead the US military
was presented with the unique challenge of combating insurgents. Six years later the US
continues to assess the progress in Iraq in hopes that the Iraqi people can soon take full
responsibility of governing and providing security for their people.
Within the first year the US military was entangled in a guerrilla style war that it had not
reckoned with. 85 At that time the US did not realize that this guerrilla style of warfare would
dominate the battlefield over the next six years. As in most guerrilla conflicts, and to make the
situation even more challenging the soldiers could not easily identify their enemy. The US
military was being targeted by insurgents who blended into the local population, as they dressed
like civilians or even woman. 86 Eventually the Pentagon came to understand that they were
dealing with multiple actors, each with their own agenda. They were not fighting the remains of
Saddam’s former intelligence and Republican Guard officers as they had assumed in the
beginning of insurgent initiated violence. 87 Instead they were up against individuals and groups
such as Muhammad’s Army or the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, who joined in the fighting to
avenge the death of a family member or to rid Iraq of American presence. 88 Mostly, however, the
angered Iraqi Sunnis were the catalyst to the insurgency movement.
The insurgency violence stoked up a civil war when the US tried to establish an Iraqi
government. This required the continued presence of the US military to try and maintain a
modicum of safety for the Iraqi population. The US is known for eagerly instilling its form of
democracy around the world; and no different was its plan in Iraq. 89 However, America’s style of
government would not necessarily work well in a country with a variety of ethnic groups all
vying for a share of the power, and the largest group continually dominating the voting bloc. 90
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Shia Iraqis make up about 60% of the Iraqi population. During Saddam Hussein’s reign as
President of Iraq the Shia were mistreated and discriminated against. Therefore, when the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraq’s transitional government, initiated the process to
create a new government the Shia clamored to have just representation.
The CPA unwisely allowed elections to take place in January 2005 when Iraq’s Sunni
population boycotted the elections because they saw American favoring a Shia majority within
the new government. 91 The Sunnis were already upset for being marginalized by the CPA, at the
beginning of the US invasion of Iraq, through US efforts of de-Ba’athification. Saddam Hussein
was Sunni and therefore favored Sunnis through employment and top government positions. The
CPA removed Sunnis from thousands of important professional jobs to eliminate the influences
of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party. 92 In the end the US, and other members of the Multinational
Forces, allowed the elections to take place. The Shiite were quick to urge for a fast timetable to
establish a government that favored their majority. 93 Thus Iraqi’s new government and
constitution was missing vital Sunni participation and influence, which only added to the already
tense political atmosphere in Iraq. 94 Except for in Iran, the Shia has never led a modern Arab
government, so they would not easily relinquish their new position of power. 95 The power
struggle between the Sunnis and the Shiite escalated into a civil war. The situation was made
even more volatile with al-Qaeda’s presence in Iraq, who were doing their best to hamper US
efforts to establish a new Iraqi government and bring peace to the country. 96
The inauguration of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on May 28, 2006 demonstrated to the
Sunni population that this new Iraqi government was not one of national reconciliation. 97 In
order for this sectarian violence to stop between the Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds, a compromise
would need to be made on how to share and use political and military power, as well as
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economic resources. 98 However, the Sunnis did not feel they would get adequate representation
within the new government. They also believed that the new Shia dominated government would
write policies in favor of the Shia political agenda. 99 Thus the Sunni insurgency began directing
their anger at US troops. They were inspired by the actions of al-Qaeda and redirected their
attacks to include the Shia. Al-Qaeda had been targeting the Shia through suicide bombings. 100
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) successfully pitted the Sunnis and the Shiites against one another,
especially after they bombed the Askariya Shrine on February 22, 2006, which had great
religious significance to the Twelfth Shiite Imam. 101 General Petraeus, the US Army’s top
military leader in Iraq, stated that AQI’s bombing of the mosque successfully destabilized the
fragile Iraqi political system. 102
AQI, an offshoot of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist group, focused on instigating
as much violence and instability as they could in Iraq. Initially the group was founded and led by
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in June 2006, when Abu Ayyab al-Masri succeeded
him. 103 According to a US National Intelligence Estimate, AQI is considered to be a very
powerful extension of bin Laden’s group, and wields a great deal of influence in Iraq. 104 AQI
introduced the use of Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) in the insurgency movement and set
the precedence for using suicide terrorists to make the deployment of IEDs more effective. The
use of IEDs became the number one weapon of choice among insurgents because it made them a
stronger contender against the US military and coalition forces. An IED is very precise as the
insurgent can detonate the device by a remote trigger or uses a suicide operative. 105 The
unpredictability of an IED’s location or when one might explode gives the insurgents the upper
hand. Through this weapon the insurgency is able to wield power over the US military, which
greatly outnumbers the insurgents. A single insurgent can cause sufficient damage to a large
36

military fleet without giving away their location, being injured or killed in the process. 106
Developing countermeasures for IEDs has proven to be challenging for the US military, as the
culprits responsible for these devices are unknown, and when insurgents become aware of an
IED countermeasure they quickly find many other ways to avoid detection. 107 Therefore, the IED
will continue to be a popular insurgent weapon against the US military and whoever else they
target as their enemy.
The insurgents’ strategy of using IEDs boded well for furthering their agenda. AQI’s goal
for instigating a civil war was to hamper the US and coalition forces efforts in establishing peace
in Iraq. 108 The group fulfilled this goal through their continued acts of violence, which not only
killed the enemy but also received media attention. The attacks themselves caused the desired
devastation, and the media presence portrayed the chaos and loss of life. This worked in the
insurgency’s advantage, because the graphic images sent a clear message, to a global audience,
that Iraq was not a secure or stable environment. By continually playing provocateur in Iraq,
AQI was using violence to undermine any progress the US and Iraqis made. The insurgents also
wanted the local population to doubt that the US military and coalition forces could protect them
against the violence. If the local population believed that the situation was proving too difficult
for the US to control, the Iraqi’s might also have doubts in the US’ commitment in quashing the
insurgency movement. 109 Lastly, the effectiveness of IEDs spurred the insurgency movement to
not give up and continue fighting. 110 The US military was able to overcome the challenges AQI
and the insurgents put before them through a surge of troops. By 2007 the violence decreased
dramatically, which helped quell al-Qaeda’s influence. 111
In a step that demonstrated the political necessity of Sunni inclusion, the Sons of Iraq, a
Sunni insurgency group, were given the responsibility of providing security. The program was
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initiated on October 1, 2008 and Iraqi Shiite government paid the Sons of Iraq a monthly salary
of $300 to act as security in Iraq neighborhoods. 112 This relieves some of the burden from the
US military, and allows US soldiers to concentrate on fighting al-Qaeda and other insurgent
groups. This US act was in recognition of the real situation, as the Sons of Iraq were already
actively providing security in the capital area before they were officially paid for this duty. 113
General Petraeus gave the group credit for the service they are providing, but disapproves of the
way the Shia government has begrudgingly handled the situation. 114
The situation in Iraq is at the center of debate among US military and political officials.
Many feel that the US should pullout of Iraq, but there are those that strongly urge the US
government not to withdraw from Iraq because of the negative consequences. In 2008 Senator
McCain was emphatic in his proclamation that if the US military withdrew al-Qaeda would take
over the country. Iraq would then serve as a base for terrorists to train and seek refuge. 115 Hillary
Clinton also attested that if the US wasn’t successful in stabilizing Iraq it would turn into “a Petri
dish for insurgents and al-Qaeda.” 116 As the pressure mounts against al-Qaeda in Iraq, a senior
intelligence officer for General Petraeus believes that AQI is shifting their attention back to
Afghanistan and looking for new locations around world. According to the military official
AQI’s resources would more effective in these locations, because of a lack in US military
presence. 117
The US’ success in Iraq is overlooked by the fact that the US military must now go back
to Afghanistan. The battle will be fought in a more severe landscape and in a different political
environment, and here too the US military will be faced with insurgents using IEDs against
them. The US cannot allow al-Qaeda continued safe haven in Afghanistan, and it must once
again rid the country of the Taliban’s reemerging presence. The US government must also
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refocus their efforts on stopping the activity that is occurring in western Pakistan, as the Afghan
government up to late had apparently turned a blind eye towards al-Qaeda and Taliban presence
in that region. The US military faces some tough challenges in the years ahead, as the situation in
Iraq seems fickle in nature, and may push itself back to the forefront as the situation in
Afghanistan is currently doing. In the meantime the US military stands its ground while facing
political and security obstacles in Iraq on a daily basis. The US continues to assist the fledgling
Iraqi state in providing security to the Iraqi people until the new government is able to stand
alone and do this for themselves.

Afghanistan Unraveled: US Reassessment

Seven years later the US military officials are struggling to prove that Afghanistan must
receive just as much attention as Iraq in terms of resources and manpower. The Bush
administration made Iraq its priority, and those currently fighting in Afghanistan must wait for
additional assistance while President Obama figures out his strategy in Afghanistan. Now the
Obama administration must listen to top military commanders who insist on more troops.
General Stanley McChrystal, President Obama’s top commander in Afghanistan, conveys the
urgency of this request in his strategic assessment of Afghanistan, which was leaked to the press
on September 21, 2009. The General predicts that if 30,000-40,000 additional troops are not
deployed to Afghanistan within the next 12 months irreparable damage will done. 118 McChrystal
believes that if this counterinsurgency strategy does not unfold soon, defeating the insurgents for
good in Afghanistan will most likely never occur. 119 President Obama needs to correct the
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previous White House administration’s mistakes, and finally give Afghanistan the attention it
should have received from the start. Had the US military received the necessary resources in
2001, it may have already ensured the complete demise of the Taliban and possibly even alQaeda.
Similar to Iraq the US also failed at nation building in Afghanistan. This crucial mistake,
in combination with an inadequacy of military presence, allowed the Taliban to reemerge. Due to
the lack of political stability, al-Qaeda and forces in Pakistan assisted this radical group in
regaining their foothold in Afghanistan. 120 The Taliban also used Afghanistan’s opium industry
as a source of income to bolster their movement. 121 As early as 2003, the US military
acknowledged hundreds of Taliban arriving back to the Helmand providence of Afghanistan
from Quetta, Pakistan to operate in the drug industry. 122 In retrospect the US government needed
to be more firm with Pakistan, as the Pakistanis allowed the Taliban fleeing from Afghanistan
safe haven. Over the next five years ex-premier Musharraf’s government did not give up a single
Taliban militant to the US, even though they were aware of Taliban’s presence. 123 The political
climate certainly didn’t bode well for Pakistan’s cooperation in voluntarily handing over the
echelon of Taliban leaders. US actions in Afghanistan had illustrated to all actors involved that
US’ top priority lie in Iraq, and Pakistan was interested in self-preservation.
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremists took advantage of the lack of Pakistan or US
military presence along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Over the years the Taliban acquired
and adapted the specialized skill of suicide terrorism through the terrorist network it had
protected and continues to support. The Taliban, and eventually the Pakistani Taliban, were
using IEDs produced and manufactured along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border under the tutelage
of al-Qaeda. 124 Taliban suicide attacks were becoming more frequent, and were highly
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organized and well thought-out. To the Afghan people suicide terrorism was a completely new
form of warfare, as they did not have to endure it through the Soviet-Afghan war. 125 The first
recorded suicide terrorist attack was in 1992 in Afghanistan’s Kunar province. 126 Also, hundreds
of mobilized Afghan Taliban attacked US and NATO troops with IEDs. 127 And the summer
months of 2008 IEDs accounted for the highest death toll of US military, Afghan police and
army since 2001. 128
Afghanistan’s problems stemmed from the presence of terrorists hiding along the
Afghan-Pakistan border in North-West Frontier Province in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA). Among the terrorists that were holed up in this region were al-Qaeda, the Afghan
Taliban, and other militants recruited from all over the world. The Pashtun tribesmen that lived
in this area were compensated to assist al-Qaeda and the Taliban attain safe haven, and they
would eventually become known as the Pakistani Taliban. 129 There was simply too much
organized terrorist activity taking place, especially in South Waziristan (FATA), to ignore. In
2006 the US demanded Pakistan’s cooperation or threatened to reduce military aid. 130 This had
the necessary effect and 2006-2007 saw an increased activity on Pakistan’s part to do something
about the Taliban. It resulted in the death of the Taliban’s second in command Mullah Akhtar
Mohammaed Usmani. 131
However, by 2008 the relationship between the US and Pakistan was once again strained.
The severity of the situation was highlighted when the CIA stopped sharing its intelligence with
Pakistan’s ISI. 132 Incredibly Pakistan continued to turn a blind eye toward the Taliban activity in
Quetta, even while the Taliban’s allies in FATA were actively involved in fighting Pakistan’s
army in Bajaur. 133 The end of 2008 would bring the largest number of dead for Western troops.
There were more deaths in Afghanistan that year and for the first time the statistics surpassed the
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number of deaths in Iraq. 134 These statistics are grim and illustrate the deteriorating situation in
Afghanistan. It is unfortunate that the victory so easily attained by the US in 2001 unraveled so
quickly in later years.
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CHAPTER III: AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS EXPLORED

Introduction

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the impact that suicide terrorism had on
the US policy and military strategy, due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US military
had to deal with many challenges over the course of both wars. However, suicide terrorism was
certainly the most perplexing enemy tactic. By analyzing the goals within the US NSS and the
QDRs, I will conclude that suicide terrorism was a significant factor that caused the US
government to change its wartime strategy. Suicide terrorism poses a serious threat to our US
military and to our citizens living in the US and abroad. However, efforts to eradicate suicide
terrorism seem almost futile. The resources to construct an IED or body bomb are available to
anyone who is determined enough to build one, and sophisticated bombs that can be detonated
from afar only require simple devices like a cell phone or an electronic key fob. 135 Additionally,
insurgents are capable of adapting quickly to IED countermeasures due to the increasing
availability of commercial electronic products. 136 This is an advantage to the terrorist
organization, as they elude the military’s countermeasures by purchasing a product that can
defeat an IED countermeasure. The US military struggles to keep their IED countermeasures
current; modern technologies such as cell phone jammers and microwaves have been used in the
IED fight. Despite the challenges presented by this cat and mouse game of countermeasure and
counter-countermeasure, it is important the US military continue their efforts. It would be
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disastrous to the US’ image in the world if it was forced to withdraw from a fight it considered
crucial to the global war on terror due to IEDs and suicide bombers.
My conclusion is that suicide terrorism resulted in the US government changing military
strategies so it could attain its goals in Afghanistan and Iraq. The material used to support my
conclusion will be drawn from an analysis of key strategic goals within the US National Security
Strategy from 2002 and 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Reviews from 2001 and 2006, and
statistics from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 2008 Report on Terrorism,
specifically focusing on the trends of Person- Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED) and
Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED)-related attacks in Afghanistan
and Iraq. It is important to note that both the analysis and conclusion in this study were attained
only through unclassified documents available only through open sources.

US Military Strategies Re-evaluated

The end of the Cold War brought about a significant change for the US military. Just as
the Soviet Union suddenly fell, so too did the rise of new threats in the global environment.
These changes impacted the US military doctrine. Thereby, new strategies were implemented to
adapt to the post Cold War environment, and be in a better position to contend with the new
security threats. The previous US military strategies focused on containing the Soviet Union.
During this period the US military maintained a large army and kept a nuclear weapons
stockpile, in case an all-out confrontation ensued. This strategy became outdated and was no
longer the best way for America to defend its national interests. 137 The US role in the Balkans,
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which centered on Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic's persecution of ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo during the 90’s, was the presumed catalyst that forced the US military to seriously
reevaluate and update the US military doctrine.138 A new military doctrine would help the US
military define their position in the post Cold War environment.
The DoD’s acknowledged the importance of adapting and updating US military doctrine
during the 90’s, especially with the boding threat of religious extremists. The 1993 Bottom-up
Review (BUR) focused on creating a smaller and more mobile military that could easily respond
to situations occurring simultaneously throughout the world. 139 In 1996 Congress mandated that
DoD undertake a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The purpose of the QDR was for DoD to
review current strategies, resources, and programs. The QDR’s main goal was to establish a
national defense strategy derived from the most recent US National Security Strategy (NSS). The
review was meant to define a defense strategy that successfully leveraged US military’s assets to
achieve US NSS’ goals. The QDR was implemented due to the BUR’s criticism of current
strategies. Additionally, in 1994 Congress mandated the Commissions on Roles and Missions
(CORM) through the National Defense Act, because many thought that the BUR inadequately
addressed the new threats in the global environment. The CORM too failed to gather many
supporters because it adhered to the two major theater war (MTW) scenario prescribed in the
BUR. However, the CORM mandated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a
clear vision for future joint operations through a major quadrennial strategy review. 140
The US Congress took the CORM’s recommendation and mandated that the DoD
undertake the 1997 QDR, as “a method to conduct a fundamental and comprehensive
examination of America’s defense needs.” 141 The first QDR was criticized for being a budget
driven assessment. The independent National Defense Panel (NDP) that reviewed the 1997
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QDR, also found fault that the two-MTW scenario was presented as a viable strategy within the
QDR. The NDP believed the two-MTW would impede the military’s ability to successfully
implement strategies that would prepare them for future threats. 142 The second QDR, released on
September 30th, 2001 presented a military strategy that adequately met future challenges and
addressed how it would protect US interests.
The DoD must now conduct a QDR every four years, as it was enacted into law by the
106th Congress. Under United States Code, Chapter 2 of title 10 Section 118 reads:
“… [every four years the Secretary of Defense will] conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense
program and policies of the United States with a view towards determining and expressing the defense strategy of
the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.” 143

The QDR follows the release of the NSS, and is due “no later than September 30 of the year in
which the review is conducted.” 144 However, DoD may allow for more time to update the
framework of the QDR if the previous NSS significantly changes the security strategy. 145 The
2001 QDR was completed prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks, when the Bush Doctrine
of preemptive self-defense had yet to be evoked. Terrorist threats had a major impact on the
2006 QDR. It also addressed how the DoD planned to meet its national security objectives with
the new challenges that were posed in the international political arena. The military roadmap,
defined in the QDR, established definitive military strategies that the US Armed Forces could
use to implement the national security strategies.
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The Roadmap to Protecting the Homeland

The 2001 QDR clearly stated the overall US national security goals: to keep America safe
and to honor America’s commitments worldwide. A consensus was reached among the highest
government officials that the US could afford to acquire whatever resources necessary to protect
the US population from threats that loomed on the horizon. The QDR was completed after much
deliberation over many months by the President and military leadership in the DoD. The 2001
QDR provided the framework for our national defense strategy and our military strategy. The
review outlined the four key goals that made up the foundation for these strategies. These goals,
as stated in the 2001 QDR, are:
•

Assuring allies and friends of the United States’ steadiness of purpose and its
capabilities to fulfill its security commitments;

•

Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten
US interests or those of our allies and friends;

•

Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat
attacks, and imposing severe penalties for aggression on an adversary’s military
capability and supporting infrastructure; and

•

Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails. 146

To achieve these goals the US government used a capabilities- based model that focused
on how the enemy would wage war against the US versus who the threat could be, or where a
war might take place. The move away from the threat based model allowed the US to
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concentrate on identifying how to overcome an enemy that depends on asymmetric warfare to
achieve its goals. This different approach acknowledges the importance of planning for
asymmetric war, in addition to the conventional wars. Additionally the review mentions that
transforming the military to adapt to this new approach will require time. It is not enough that the
military doctrine adapt to the strategy of the adversary, but military capabilities must also adjust
accordingly so the military objectives can be successfully achieved.
Homeland security remained our government’s top priority in the 2002 NSS. Like the
2001 QDR, the somber tone in the 2002 NSS, noted how the enemy’s tactics have changed. Our
adversaries employ new strategies to put the US and US interests in harm’s way. No longer is the
threat tied to simply one nation state, but adversaries are bound together through the
technological advantages in this globalized world. If rogue terrorists attack the US, this means
that our military cannot focus on defeating the military of one nation, and therefore must employ
other strategies to defeat this new kind of enemy. The US will not allow attacks from various
terrorist organizations, or any other enemy, to negatively affect the obligations the US has
throughout the international community. The US takes these responsibilities seriously, as the
NSS states that the US gladly takes the lead to thwart those that infringe on peoples’ basic civil
liberty: freedom.
President Bush’s administration laid out the goals in the 2002 NSS in order to
successfully lead this endeavor. The scope of this mission also included stopping threats
emanating from failing states, where radical extremists focused on acquiring Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMDs) to use against the US or its allies and inflict great harm. The three goals
presented in the 2002 NSS:
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•

Political and economic freedom

•

Peaceful relations with other states

•

Respect for human dignity 147

The goals are meant to reflect American internationalism and the 2002 NSS strategy aimed at
making the world not only safer, but better. The 2002 NSS described eight objectives that
guided the US to achieve the three goals listed above. The first objective supported mankind’s
desire for dignity. The second objective was to strengthen the US’ global partnerships to stop
terrorism from occurring against our country, and that of our allies’. Through these relationships,
the third objective is to foster a sense of collaboration to work together to subdue regional
conflicts. The fourth objective stated that a strong sense of unity and teamwork will go a long
way and work to hinder an enemy from threatening the US or its allies with WMDs. The fifth
objective aimed to stimulate the global economy through growth in the free market and trade.
Additionally, economic expansion would increase development by establishing the foundations
of democracy, and opening societies to reap the benefits of a free market economy, which is the
sixth objective. The seventh objective stated in the 2002 NSS described “developing agendas for
cooperative action with other main center of global power.” 148 Lastly, in order to achieve the
three main goals, the US government’s national security institutions needed to be transformed to
be able to stand up against its adversaries and defend our national interests in the 21st century.
The 2002 NSS continued with the tenets established in the framework of the 2001 QDR.
The palpable threat of radical extremists was addressed, as the one year anniversary of the
September 11 atrocities had already passed by when the 2002 NSS was made public. OEF in
Afghanistan visibly demonstrated the US military’s commitment to ensure the success of the US
government’s main national security goal: keeping America safe. OEF embodied the four key
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goals established in the 2001 QDR. As the US government had been unable to prevent the 9/11
attacks, the swift military campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban were justified because our
nation was provoked to defend itself, and ultimately protect the America people. Through this
no- nonsense approach the US military successfully demonstrated its conventional capability and
defeated the adversaries in Afghanistan. The quick win in Afghanistan sent a clear message to
any foe of the US. America would unleash its full potential to protect its interests. US actions
during this scenario also ensured their allies, friends, and the global community that the US was
sincere in its international commitment to protect political and economic liberty.
The 2006 US NSS was released in March 2006. In the 2006 US NSS introduction,
President Bush described how easily the US could retreat toward the strategy of isolationism.
However, the President brushed this notion aside and instead encouraged the chosen option of
acting preemptively against threats to protect the US. Protectionism, President Bush argued,
would have resulted in the loss of momentum and missed opportunities. (Perhaps he was
referring to President Clinton’s missed opportunity to arrest and or kill Osama bin Laden while
al-Qaeda’s leader was still residing in Sudan.) Due to bin Laden’s horrific plot on that fateful
September day, the US was forced to acknowledge the stark reality of the new international
security environment, and more importantly the need to take swift action.
The overarching goal of the 2006 US NSS goal was to protect all Americans. This goal is
supported by two pillars: the first stating:
•

Promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity-working to end tyranny

•

Promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair
trade and wise development policies.
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The second pillar of the 2006 NSS:
•

Confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of
democracies. 149

Democratic values play a significant role in the fabric of American society and politics. The
thought behind instilling democratic values, in contentious nations and elsewhere around the
world, is the belief that this will ultimately help stop the influence of radical extremists and other
adversaries. The US believes that democracies tend to act more responsibly in the international
political arena. Therefore, promoting democracy around the world is the “most effective longterm measure for strengthening international stability,” and the amount of freedom a nation gives
its citizens is the measuring device. 150 The first goal described how nations need to work
together to end tyrannical rulers. People living under these leaders are robbed of certain
freedoms, thus these despotic systems are responsible for curtailing the spread of democracy.
Stopping tyrannies does not end there. The second goal promotes assisting new free nations to
establish effective democracies. This included illustrating how important democratic values,
rights, and institutions all have an interconnected part in creating a political and social
environment where citizens have access to all freedoms. The third goal aimed at advancing
freedom around the world, simultaneously fulfills our national security interests back home. The
last goal presented in the 2006 US NSS reaffirms that this goal ultimately supports the US
government’s end goal, which is the security and safety of the American people.
US leaders did not forget that the American people once struggled to attain certain rights
and freedoms. The US government’s vision of an entire global community that shares our
democratic values, will take time to foster. The goal is simply aimed at promoting a world where
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people can live without fear, and an international community that encourages their citizens to act
with humanity’s best interests in mind. The 2006 US NSS focused on accomplishing nine tasks
that support these goals. The first task aimed to advocate mankind’s desire for dignity. The next
one describes the need to strengthen America’s global partnerships to stop terrorism from
occurring against our country, or that of our allies’. The third task stated the importance to foster
relationships. By working together, the global community can cool down political hot spots. A
strong sense of unity and teamwork will go a long way and work to hinder an enemy from
threatening the US or its allies with WMDs. The fifth task mentioned a global economy
experiencing growth through free market and trade. Increasing economic prosperity would
expand the democratic framework around the world. The Bush administration’s seventh task
stated a need to “develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global
power.” 151 An important goal that was laid out as the eighth task was the vital transformation of
US’ national security institutions. This task must be successfully completed, especially in light of
the type of adversaries our country is up against. Lastly, the American government needs to use
aspects of globalization to their advantage, while also tackling the challenges this can present.
The 2006 QDR came five years after the US became intensely embroiled with the War
against Terrorism. The document notes that if radical extremists equip themselves with WMDs,
then what is to stop them from targeting all free people? In 2006 the US was ardently focused on
the wars occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, this doesn’t imply that the US won’t stop
planning for or be prepared to defend the homeland or US interests in the years to come. The
2006 review clarified assumptions that this new QDR would assert “new beginnings” for the US
DoD. And according to the document, the US government recognized the change in the
international security arena and initiated a transformation of government institutions. This would
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allow the US to be better positioned in the post-Cold War environment. This policy, in addition
to other government policies and strategies, are examples of how resolute the US government is
at doing everything in their power to protect the US. Then Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld summarized the goal for the strategic framework established in the 2006 QDR was to
provide “change, leading to victory.” 152
History can be evaluated to provide ideas and strategies from similar scenarios of the past
to assist in adapting current policies and strategies to attain victory. In this case, history is able to
provide lessons learned to our military because they have been fighting against global extremists
for many years. A theme that continued throughout the 2006 QDR was transforming DoD to
meet the challenges presented through both asymmetric and conventional warfare. Therefore,
military leadership analyzed the results from the 2001 QDR when creating the new roadmap for
DoD. The policy also warned that the focus is currently on combating the threats in Afghanistan
and Iraq. However, in the years to come our government must be prepared to simultaneously
fight in many locations around the world. The two goals presented in this QDR describe
achievements that need to be fulfilled over the next few generations. DoD recommends that:
•

Continuing to reorient the DoD’s capabilities and forces to be more agile in this
time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges, and to hedge against
uncertainty over the next 20 years.

•

Implementing enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational structures,
processes and procedures effectively support its strategic direction. 153

The 2006 QDR goals reflect the intense focus the government has on providing directions
through strategies to better prepare for adversaries that attack American with irregular warfare.
This intense focus is also directed at creating a stronger military and intelligence community, so
that our country might never have to face another 9/11.
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The 2006 QDR was built on the framework established in the March 2005 National
Defense Strategy, which addressed DoD’s need to meet the challenges presented in the form of
irregular warfare. The review also wanted to give the President more military options, which
would bolster US strategy when going up against asymmetric threats. In order to successfully
win the War against Terror, and any other future conflicts, military leadership listed key strategic
changes that illustrated just how DoD planned on transforming. Some of these shifts in strategy,
included on the list, depicted how our military is conducting combat in countries we are not at
war with. This describes the safe havens our adversaries find around the world. The shift in
strategy takes the focus away from only conducting war against nations. As rogue nations and
terrorist organizations act with no reservation or without regard to international laws, their
actions can be unpredictable. Therefore, the US military must adapt from a bygone era of
reasonableness and predictability to today’s political environment of surprise and uncertainty. 154
Together the 2006 US NSS and the 2006 QDR provide the roadmap for US actions in the
new international security environment. The White House established the US’ direction in the
2006 US NSS. It also set the foundation for how DoD will meet these requirements. This
underscores the importance of aligning the 2006 QDR to the tenets within the 2006 US NSS. The
goals defined in the 2006 QDR intertwine with the results expected for the 2006 US NSS goals.
The 2006 US NSS focuses on ending and stopping terrorism from occurring in our country or
anywhere in the world. Therefore the 2006 QDR envisioned DoD transforming the military to
become more agile. The military can no longer think only in terms of waging war in the
conventional sense.
The other 2006 US NSS goals promoted democracy through open and competitive
markets, and through abolishing the hindrances that impede democracies from growing
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throughout the global community. The 2006 QDR DoD highlighted a visible shift in US strategic
thinking. In order to remove the impediments that challenge democratic expansion, DoD
identified four priorities that will operationalize the strategy established in the 2006 review. The
first priority is to defeat terrorist networks. September 11th and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
demonstrated to us that defeating these radical extremist groups is crucial to our national
security. DoD must go beyond protecting America only from terrorists by defending the
homeland in depth. The second priority identified that threats to our national security could come
in forms other than hijacked airliners, and can be through weaponized biological, chemical,
radiological and nuclear weapons. The third priority goes hand in hand with the second priority,
and stated that the US needs to prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using
WMD. 155 This DoD priority addresses one of the nine tasks discussed in the 2006 US NSS. The
American government also needs to tackle the challenges presented by globalization. Our
globalized world, and modern technology, has allowed individuals and groups to become
empowered. They will use these unconventional ways to threaten our country, because they
know the US cannot use normal military force to stop them. These actors claim no affiliation to
a single country. Consequently nothing inhibits them from breaking international law, as they
don’t have anything to lose in the conventional sense of government infrastructure, financial
systems, or energy networks. The US military can’t retaliate against them in a conventional
sense, because that would cause unwarranted harm to innocent actors within that country. This of
course doesn’t apply to nations that allow individuals or terrorist groups a safe haven. A
globalized world can work in our favor of our security if we strengthen our global relationships,
and work together to curb the influences and actions of these adversaries.
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The last of the four priorities also worked in favor of the goals set out in the 2006 US
NSS. DoD recommended to assist countries that are at important junctures in that nation’s
political or social history. This support would ensure the right decisions would be made, which
could greatly affect their future. This not only plays into the important goal of promoting
effective democracies, but also illustrates how America is taking their role seriously of leading
democratic growth throughout the international arena. The comparable difference between the
2002 US NSS and the 2006 US NSS is that the US garnered much experience between the
publication of the two documents. In 2002 the county was still reeling from the aftershocks of
the 9/11 attacks. The 2001 QDR correctly foreshadowed the need to transform the military to
successfully handle the changes in the national security environment; that of irregular warfare.
The 2002 US NSS goals illustrated the political climate of that time period. The terrorist attacks
struck at the core of our democratic values. The terror that they imparted onto our country on
September 11th deprived Americans of a sense of freedom which took a long time to rebuild. AlQaeda targeted the World Trade Center because it was a significant financial symbol in the
democratic nation. This was another attack at our democratic value, which allowed for the
expansion of economic growth through free market competition. Therefore, the 2002 sustainable
model for national success in the 2002 US NSS makes sense: democracy, freedom, and free
enterprise. 156
As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had been well under way for many years, the 2006
US NSS unequivocally stated that the US government’s intention is to protect the security of the
American people. The 2002 US NSS set the foundation for why we needed to fight and defend
our freedoms. In the 2006 US NSS the government had a better understanding of the terrorists
and insurgents who we were contending with. However, even after four years of unconventional
56

warfare, the 2006 US NSS high-level goals were kept pretty much the same. The 2002 US NSS
goals were “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and a respect
for human dignity.” 157 The 2006 US NSS promoted “freedom, justice, and human dignityworking to end tyranny; promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free
and fair trade and wise development policies;” and lastly to “confront the challenges of our time
by leading a growing community of democracies.” 158 The Bush administration even kept the
various tasks the same that were meant to accomplish the overall goals in the 2002 and 2006 US
NSS. The 2002 US NSS instructed that the government would achieve eight objectives, and the
results would support the accomplishment of the model for national success. The nine tasks in
the 2006 US NSS differed only slightly and that was due to the addition of the ninth task. A
globalized world represented a smaller world in which nations, groups, and individuals use
technology to advance their own agendas. Some of this technology is used and acquired to
threaten American interests. Therefore, the task that was added in the 2006 US NSS addressed
how the American government needed to use aspects of our globalized world to the US’
advantage, but also tackle the challenges this can present.
The Bush administration viewed the progress in Afghanistan and Iraq as successfully
achieving the objectives stated in the 2002 US NSS. The people in Afghanistan and Iraq were
given back access to all freedoms, which would otherwise be granted in democracies. The
removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein gave way to the possibility for these countries to
experience freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. Even though these objectives were viewed
as successful, they were repeated again in the 2006 US NSS, because our world is still not
completely void of oppressive regimes. There are many countries in their infancy of democratic
development, and require the support from other democratic nations so they will permanently
57

integrate the principles of democracy into the fabric of their society. Other global citizens are not
given access to economic prosperity due to anti-free market authoritarianism. 159 Whereas some
countries might once have enjoyed democratic freedoms, these freedoms are being taken away
from their citizens. The advancement of democratic values will not only assist the global
community, but will ultimately protect our own national interests. The roadmaps portrayed in the
2002 and 2006 US NSS, as well as in the 2001 and 2006 QDR discussed how America aims to
confront the challenges in this post Cold War security environment. The documents, detailed in
the pages above, have discussed how the seeds of transformation are taking place within our
military, so that the US is unrivaled in their ability to match the threats from asymmetric
strategies. However, our government leadership warns us not to forget other types of adversaries,
as we must be ready on all fronts. The next chapter will provide a conclusion as to whether the
suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq were significant enough to facilitate the US government
to change their strategies listed in the 2002 and 2006 US NSS, and in the 2001 and 2006 QDR.
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CHAPTER IV: THE ROAD AHEAD
Introduction

The previous chapters illustrated how quickly the landscape within the international
political security environment can change. For many years the US concentrated on keeping their
prime adversary at bay during the Cold War, which was how the US was drawn into assisting the
mujahedeen fight the Soviets. During this time period US political and military policies and
strategies reflected how significantly threatened the US felt toward the Russia’s influence around
the world. When the Soviet Union collapsed and their power lie in ruins along with their
economy, the US acknowledged that the US’ current policies and strategies were as obsolete as
Russia’s power. The Cold War did not involve the US with any direct military confrontation with
their Cold War opponent. However, US actions during this time illustrated the competition
between the two countries. Among the US strategy to keep Russia in check, the US engaged in a
nuclear arms race and technology competition. This resulted in the Space Race to see who could
out do one another’s space technology. The policies and strategies the US had in place, to deter
their Cold War adversary, would not have passed the muster when confronted by the new enemy
that loomed in the horizon.
Al-Qaeda, like the Soviet Union, was primed for a war of ideologies with the US.
However, unlike Russia, these radical extremists purposefully provoked the US to actively go to
war with them. Al-Qaeda willing sacrificed the lives of members of their organization to kill
innocent people around the world through suicide attacks. This strategy is vastly different from
how Russia acted towards the US throughout the Cold War. The title given to this period sums
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up how it was a cold war. The only “fighting” that took place was through the various
competitions, including military buildup and industrial development. The policy of containment,
established in the Truman Doctrine, would not have effectively fought this type of enemy if US
strategy had not changed. The War on Terrorism is far from a cold war, as reflected by the body
count left in the wake of al-Qaeda’s global terrorist attacks. Together the US military and
Congress had the foresight to acknowledge that the US needed to be prepared to fight a different
adversary.

The External Influences to America’s Roadmap

The conclusion presented in this chapter will illustrate how suicide terrorism was a
significant factor to elicit the US government to change their strategy and policy. The
government strategy and policy that were analyzed in this study served to forever freeze a
moment in history. By comparing and contrasting the goals in the previous US NSS and the
QDRs, it is apparent that the suicide attacks occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq had an impact on
US NSS and military strategy. The 2001 QDR took a snapshot of the US military’s roadmap
prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The review was mainly completed before al-Qaeda and Osama
bin Laden became a household name. The stark difference between the 2006 QDR and the 2001
QDR is that the 2006 QDR was completed when the US was very aware of their adversary. The
2001 QDR had been initiated so that the US would be prepared for whatever threat would fill the
void left by their Cold War enemy. Therefore comparing the goals of the 2001 QDR to the goals
of the 2006 QDR indicated how external influences elicited a change in military strategy,
through the goals established in the US NSS.
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The void left by the USSR was not kept open for long, and the US was introduced to a
new adversary on September 11th, 2001. The new enemy employed an irregular warfare
campaign that was built on surprise and deception. From this day on the US would have to
confront the dangers brought on by asymmetric warfare, and a clear vision of combat was vital.
The US military faced the perils of their unconventional methods through the suicide terrorism
attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was a popular tactic dictated through the terrorists’
irregular warfare strategy. NCTC collected data on how often suicide attacks occurred in
Afghanistan and Iraq from 2005-2008. These statistics were compared to the goals of the 2001
QDR and the 2002 US NSS and the goals of the 2006 US NSS and the 2006 QDR. By analyzing
the number of suicide attacks to the comparison of how the goals were written for each year, a
conclusion was drawn to how much of an impact suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq had on
the US NSS and QDR. Even though the NCTC data is available only from 2005-2008 the 2002
US NSS goals provided the framework for government policy and strategy for four years. Where
the 2002 US NSS leaves off the 2006 US NSS establishes the framework for the military
roadmap until 2010. The 2002 US NSS goals will be applied to analyze the NCTC statistics for
2005. The statistics from 2006-2008 will be analyzed using the 2006 US NSS. Therefore, a
complete analysis can be done using the NCTC statistics, as the differences in how the goals
changed will be analyzed using these numbers.
The 2001 QDR could not predict, with a hundred percent accuracy, which actors or
nations would threaten US security or our interests. The policy did identify that the US could be
threatened from a variety of capabilities, including asymmetric warfare or with enemies wielding
WMDs. The 2001 QDR recognized that even though the enemies’ identity might be vague, the
military could still plan on discouraging actors, which could potentially cause harm to the US or
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US interests harm, by stopping programs or operations that threaten the US in any way. Even
though the 2001 QDR mentioned the potential of being attacked by adversaries using
asymmetric warfare, the goals do not specifically include this in the wording. The 2006 QDR
goals however, specifically include tackling this issue. Also, one of the 2002 US NSS objectives
that are aligned with achieving the 2002 US NSS goals, mention stopping terrorism with the
assistance of global partners. Additionally, the document stresses the importance of bolstering
US national security institutions. The 2001 QDR elaborately lays out how the military will
operationalize its goals.
From the goals the military plans are derived to successfully achieve defending the US.
DoD established strategic tenets that comprised the US defense strategy from the 2001 QDR
goals. Additionally, the military took a different approach in how they planned their operations.
This supported the defense strategy through new models of thinking. And given the new security
environment the transformation of the US military included changing its global military posture,
as well as ensuring that the US military has all the required capabilities to defeat any adversary.
Together these elements constituted the US military’s position in the post Cold War
environment.
The strategic tenets from the 2001 QDR include managing risks, a capabilities- based
approach, defending the US and projecting US military power, strengthening alliances and
partnerships, maintaining favorable regional balances, developing a broad base portfolio of
military capabilities, and transforming defense. 160 In times of war the US military often has the
hard task of making decisions because of budget restrictions. Therefore, the US military has to
find the delicate balance of preparing for the right risk. Concurrently, the military must be ready
for future threats, and also be prepared for battle at any given moment. The capabilities-based
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approach enables the US to anticipate how an adversary might threaten the US. In this section
the review mentions adversaries willing to use asymmetric warfare strategies against the US. The
US is then able to focus on developing their capabilities to be able to defend the US and US
interests against specific tactics from the asymmetric strategy arsenal.
Projecting our military power leverages the military’s ability to defend the US. First and
foremost, the US military must be able to protect the homeland. The US was so focused on
creating a strong presence abroad that unintentionally left our own country vulnerable to attacks.
The US military believes that our adversaries are targeting military vulnerabilities in our
homeland. In the 2001 QDR DoD planned to concentrate on projecting a strong military
presence at home and at long range to deter threats against the US. A strong military presence
can be fostered by strengthening US global relationships. Not only does this positively impact
the US’ security interests, these relationships help create political stability. Countries working
together will need to engage in training and joint operations to better establish these mutually
reinforcing security relationships. 161
Just as critically important as maintaining relationships throughout the world there is a
continued need for US presence in specific countries. Some areas of the world are especially
prone to the activities of our adversaries. However, if the US is present our enemy has to at least
weigh the consequences of their actions, and if it is worth their efforts. There would be no
benefits to the US maintaining relationships and their presence throughout the world if they are
unable to acquire the best current military capabilities. The strategic tenet of how the US plans
on developing their military capabilities, acknowledges that the US arsenal must be able to go up
against current and future threats. More importantly is the US’ plans to develop new weapons
technologies to give the US the upper hand against their enemy on any battlefield. Lastly, DoD is
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aware that a new era is afoot. If the military did not transform itself meet the challenges in the
new environment, the homeland would suffer the consequences. The elements describe above
however, illustrate a clear picture as to how DoD will not allow that to happen.
Transforming the military to adapt to the 21st century challenges also requires the model
of thinking within the military to change as well. The main goal of the US military is to defend
the US, and the new model is emphatic that this strategic focus is key. In order to achieve this,
the US military needs to have enough forces to protect the homeland and US interests.
Specifically, the 2001 QDR notes that the US must be prepared to react to international terrorism
attacks, if the aggressors targeted US territory or US interests. US military forces would be
tailored to meet the unique challenges within a specific region. This presence would work to
prevent attacks in these regions against the US, our military, or on our allies. Through this new
model, military leadership hoped that in the future the US military could work together with their
allies in these regions to quickly defeat any encroaching threat. Additionally, the US could call
on forces from one region to assist in other region. Ultimately, the 2001 QDR planned that the
US military should be able to effectively engage in major combat operations occurring in
different regions at the same time.
DoD’s new paradigm shift recommended that the US military keep enough forces at hand
for small scale operations. The reason behind this approach illustrated that the US military would
be prepared when a spontaneous event occurred, without having to worry about how long the
battle would last, the frequency of the events, or whether there were enough soldiers. In the
review military leadership noted that DoD would make sure that when forces were involved in
such operations, there would be enough specialized military personnel and weaponry to support
the small scale operation. DoD must also re-adjust where they select to place their forces in the
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specific regions around the world. No longer do all of the strategic US military bases placed
around the world benefit the US, as these once did during the Cold War. According to the 2001
QDR, this reorganization is necessary in order to reorient the US military’s global posture.
It is crucial that our troops be placed in the most logical regions throughout the world, as
to better face the challenges of today’s security environment. In addition to readjusting US
military bases, DoD found that asserting our global stance included developing the best offensive
and defensive capabilities. This would serve many purposes, and not only protect the US, US
interests, or their allies against their adversaries’ military strategies. US capabilities needed to
include “missile defenses, defensive information operations, and counter-terrorist operations” to
protect and defend against conventional and asymmetric weapons. 162 As shown by the statistics
provided by NCTC, the US military would put these strategies to the test as their adversaries in
Afghanistan, and especially in Iraq were prone to use the tactics of asymmetric warfare.

The National Counterterrorism Center’s Statistics Interpreted

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) produced the 2008 Report on Terrorism
on April 30, 2009. To clearly comprehend NCTC’s statistics, it is important to know how the
government organization defined terrorism. NCTC established the definition in 2005. According
to NCTC their definition of terrorism is described as, “premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against non-combatant target by sub-national groups or clandestine
agents.” 163 The statistics gathered in the 2008 Report on Terrorism were subject to the accuracy
of terrorist attacks being reported through public media. Collecting this type of data can be
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increasingly challenging when attacks occur in remote areas around the world, or if they happen
to affect only a small group of people.
The reason the 2008 Report on Terrorism statistics begin in 2005 is due to NCTC’s
changing their methodology; the information collected across different years became
incompatible because in 2004 NCTC used the international terrorism definition as the basis for
their methodology, which the report notes limited their scope of work. When collecting statistics
on suicide related attacks, the perpetrator had to have died as a result, in order for NCTC to count
it as a suicide related attack. The concept of a PBIED is explained as a human having an IED on
their persons, thus becoming part of the bomb. An explanation of what constitutes a SVBIED is
when a suicide bomber includes a vehicle as part of their suicide attack. This information is
relevant because this study specifically analyzes the trends of PBIED and SVBIED relating to
suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The NCTC statistics illustrate that the PBIED and SVBIED attacks in Afghanistan are
very low in 2005. The intelligence gathering institution recorded only 7 PBIEDs and 8 SVBIEDs
for that year. The situation in Iraq, on the other hand, was quite different. In 2005 there were 71
PBIED attacks and 274 SVBIED attacks. The information provided above, supported the
roadmap for the military through the goals established in the 2001 QDR. The plans described in
the strategic tenets, the US military’s operational paradigm shift, and the reorienting of the US
military global posture all aimed at providing the US military with an advantage to any future
adversary. Highlighted within this document was preparing the military for the possibility of an
enemy that used irregular warfare. However, according to the NCTC’s 2008 Report on
Terrorism, the US military’s enemies were already using this strategy.
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The methods employed by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq to curb the insurgency, alQaeda, and other actors from using suicide terrorism seem ineffective when comparing the
PBIED and SVBIED statistics in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2005 to 2006. In Afghanistan the
PBIED and SVBIED attacks rose dramatically, occurring 39 and 51 times respectively. In Iraq
the PBIED attacks were down from 71 to 59 attacks. Almost hundred less SVBIED attacks
occurred in Iraq that year, which brought the total to 175 for 2006. Like the 2001 QDR the 2006
QDR explains how the military will operationalize the goals provided within that review. The
security environment changed considerably from the release of the 2001 QDR to the release of
the 2006 QDR. The military roadmap defined in this review supports the national security goals
the White House had for 2006. As suicide terrorism was occurring with increasing frequency, it
should become apparent through the comparison of the 2006 QDR to the 2001 QDR, if this
activity elicited the US military to change their strategy.

Table 1: 2005‐2008 Suicide terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq

Afghanistan

Iraq

PBIED

SVBIED

PBIED

SVBIED

2005

7

8

71

274

2006

39

51

59

175

2007

75

38

92

271

2008
57
47
100
Source: Statistics taken from NCTC’s 2008 Report on Terrorism
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Table 2: 2005‐2008 PBIED attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq

Table 3: 2005‐2008 SVBIED attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq

68

The differences between the 2001 and 2006 QDR are immediately noticeable. As
mentioned above the 2001 QDR was compiled before the September 11th attacks took place, and
the US could not identify with certainty what actors were targeting to harm the US. Therefore the
US military leadership was trying to prepare military capabilities to face any tactic of war. The
2006 QDR specifically stated that since 9/11 the US is engaged on the War against Terrorism,
and our adversaries are global terrorist networks. 164 This enemy employs irregular warfare
strategies that not only include suicide terrorism, but more significantly DoD fears that these
groups will acquire and use WMDs to kill Americans and other people around the world.
Suicide terrorist attacks continued to occur with relatively higher frequency in Iraq than
in Afghanistan, which is illustrated by the NCTC’s statistics until 2008. By 2008 PBIED attacks
were reportedly the highest since 2005, occurring 100 times. The reverse is said for SVBIED
attacks, and by 2008 suicide attacks with vehicles was at its lowest point with 117 attacks
accounted for. Afghanistan’s statistics didn’t stay as constant as Iraq’s suicide attacks, and from
2006 to 2008 the numbers continued to volley up and down. Compared to the previous year,
2007 PBIED statistics increased to 75. And in 2008 these numbers dropped to 57, but 2005 could
still claim to have seen the least amount of violence. SVBIED attacks dropped to 38 from 2006,
and then rose again to 47 in 2008. Information in the 2006 QDR provides an explanation as why
the suicide attacks occur in less abundantly in Afghanistan than they do in Iraq.
As detailed in previous chapters of this study al-Qaeda is active in both Afghanistan and
Iraq. However, Iraq holds a greater significance to al-Qaeda in terms of how America’s War on
Terrorism will play out. The terrorist organization has verbalized how they cannot allow the US
to gain a strategic win in Iraq. One of Al-Qaeda’s leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri, stated before he
was killed in US attacks that the US won’t win in Iraq unless they occupy the country. His next
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words imply that America won’t successfully gain control over Iraq, because “the Islamic
movement needs an Islamic base in the heart of an Arab region.” 165 Therefore, military
leadership reached the conclusion that al-Qaeda would be even more tenacious in their attacks in
Iraq. Additionally, DoD believed that the radical extremists’ message, when delivered in Iraq,
was a stark contrast to the historical beginning of democracy that came from the country.166 AQI
meddled in Iraqi politics and purposefully instigated violence to undo progress that had been
made by coalition forces in Iraq. In 2001 DoD accurately set the foundation for the military to
have the capability to face any challenge. The 2006 QDR worked from this foundation, and with
the adversary in their crosshairs they built a military roadmap that successfully defined their role
in the new security environment.
In the four years after the 2001 QDR goals were written, DoD set to accomplish these
goals. Through the implementation of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) the US military
touched on one of the major items in the 2001 QDR, which was to reform their global military
posture around the world. The BRAC assessment allowed the US military to close military
installations that were no longer necessary, and to open US bases that were crucial to winning
the long war of global terrorism as well as any other future foe. The 2006 QDR continued this
theme of reorienting the US military to adapt to the new security environment. Therefore, the
2006 QDR goals support this model of change and reassessment. DoD’s emphasis on focusing
on a model of continuous change for the US military’s strategy and operational planning,
illustrates how the US is highly adaptive, like their current adversary. This is crucial to win any
battle and stay in control within the security environment, and not only to win in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
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In order to be successful in the short and long term, military leaders recognized in the
2006 QDR that our military strategy requires both the use of conventional and unconventional
methods. In order to achieve the QDR’s goals, DoD wanted to strengthen their position in
additional areas. These areas support the military preparation to confront the wider asymmetric
challenges, and the new strategic direction works in tandem with these objectives. The additional
roadmaps include department institutional reform and governance, irregular warfare, building
partnership capacity, strategic communication, and intelligence. The challenges of the security
environment are also addressed through four priorities established by government and military
leaders to operationalize the strategy, which are “defeating terrorist networks, defending the
homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing
hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.” 167 In combination these areas
of focus work to improve the US military.
The 2001 QDR came at a crucial time for US government and military leadership to
define America’s role in the post Cold War environment. During the 90’s al-Qaeda and other
terrorists were attacking US through our interests in other countries, but in 2001 they changed
their modus of operandi and targeted our homeland. Defeating terrorist networks took on a new
meaning when this attack occurred in the US, and caused indescribable damage. In this global
age it is imperative that the US come together with their international partners and create an
environment that is intolerant of terrorist organizations. This is has been an ongoing goal could
not have been more called for, and is has been present throughout the US NSS in 2002 and 2006.
Terrorist organizations need to understand that the US and its allies are working together to
increase the pressure so terrorists will find it difficult to organize further attacks. The US will use
indirect approaches with their global partners to make it harder for radical extremists to find safe
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havens around the world. Terrorist activity will be stopped through surveillance, intelligence,
sustained unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency capabilities. 168 More
importantly the QDR hails that this ideological battle will be successfully won through moderate
Muslim nations speaking out against these groups and their actions. 169
Defending the homeland is the top priority of the US government. With the onset of a
globalized world the US faces considerable benefits, but also dangers are presented through these
phenomena. As seen by 9/11 our country’s geographic location no longer offers us additional
protection. Besides terrorists using airplanes as missiles within our country, there is still the
threat our adversaries will use long range missiles and WMDs to penetrate our defenses.
Unfortunately, the globalized world means that countries are not the only actors who can acquire
these weapons, but also individuals and terrorist organizations. DoD is looking at every possible
angle an enemy might try to attack our country with a missile or WMD, even scrutinizing
shipping vessels as a means for which our foe might think to smuggle a WMD into our nation.
Our military and intelligence community are actively trying to locate and prevent would be
assailants or attacks on America. Our military has the capability and the justification to disrupt
and intercept an enemy from encroaching on our national security. DoD’s goal for reasserting
US presence around the world will send the message that the US is prepared to strike if attacked.
The US will not hesitate to attack, and therefore it is in the best interest of would be assailants
not to think about provoking the US into such an engagement.
The War on Terror is not only a US concern. There are many countries that find
themselves at strategic crossroads, and the 2006 QDR went into some detail illustrating where
potential actors could affect the US and US interests and those of its friends. As the War on
Terrorism is an active part of the US’ mission, countries in the Middle East are essential in
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fighting this battle of ideologies. Through these actions the US wants to establish that all actors
in the international political arena benefit from a cooperative environment. The goal is to ensure
that not one actor has total control over regional security. The fear of WMDs falling into the
wrong hands is as great a threat as the current War on Terrorism. The 2006 QDR acknowledges
that the US needs to actively work on preventing actors or nations from using or acquiring
WMDs. The US military needs to accurately collect intelligence on WMD programs worldwide.
This intelligence information will assist the US in locating, tagging, and tracking WMD
materials, which will work to deter a WMD attack. Additionally, the US should concentrate on
the removal of WMD materials when appropriate. Terrorists and hostile nations can acquire
WMDs from other hostile actors who are willing to sell their technology or weapons. The US
military is also aware that some nations do not have an adequate means of safely controlling and
protecting access to WMDs. Politically unstable nations that have WMDs also pose a threat, as
these weapons can go to the wrong actors. Ultimately, it is in the US’ interest to stop terrorist
actors from attaining WMDs. The events of 9/11 demonstrated that one can never be too
prepared. As the world gets smaller, with the onset of even greater and faster technologies, the
US needs to be vigilant and stand firmly behind the values we instill. The US is well on its way,
due to the detailed roadmap created through the goals of the US NSS and the QDR.
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